Change We Can\u27t Believe In . . . or Afford:  Why the Timing Is Wrong to Reduce the Estate Tax for the Wealthiest Americans by Smith, Phyllis C
Florida A&M University College of Law
Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law
Journal Publications Faculty Works
Spring 2012
Change We Can't Believe In . . . or Afford: Why the
Timing Is Wrong to Reduce the Estate Tax for the
Wealthiest Americans
Phyllis C. Smith
Florida A&M University College of Law, phyllis.taite@famu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/faculty-research
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, Taxation-Federal Estate
and Gift Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. For more information, please contact
linda.barrette@famu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Phyllis C. Smith, Change We Can't Believe In . . . or Afford: Why the Timing Is Wrong to Reduce the Estate Tax for the Wealthiest
Americans, 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493 (2012).
THE UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 42 SPRING 2012
ARTICLES
NUMBER 3
Change We Can't Believe In ... or Afford:
Why the Timing Is Wrong to Reduce the
Estate Tax for the Wealthiest Americans
PHYLLIS C. SMITH *
I. INTRODUCTION 494
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TRANSFER TAXES .498
A. History ofEstate Taxes .498
B. Role ofthe Gift Tax 503
III. TRANSFER TAXES AS SOURCES OF REVENUE 505
A. Role ofthe Estate Tax as a Source ofRevenue 505
B. Tax Policy Changes that Inhibit the
Estate Tax's Potential to Raise Revenue 508
C. Change We Can't Believe In or Afford 513
IV. CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS 517
A. History ofthe Charitable Contribution Deduction 517
* Associate Professor of Law at Florida Agricultural & Mechanical
University College of Law; J.D., Florida State University College of Law;
LL.M. (Taxation), University of Florida Levin College of Law. I thank Profes-
sor Jim Repetti and Associate Dean Darryll K. Jones for comments and editorial
advice on prior drafts. 1 appreciate the thoughtful comments provided by my
colleagues at a writing workshop led by Dean Jeremy Levitt at Florida A&M
College of Law, and by participants at the 2011 Junior Tax Scholars Conference
held at the University of California, Irvine School of Law, and by the partici-
pants at the 2011 Lutie Lytle Writing Workshop at Texas Southern University,
Thurgood Marshall School of Law. I am also grateful to my research assistants
Josephine Balzaac and Megan Kachur.
493
494 The University ofMemphis Law Review Vol. 42
B. History and Justifications ofthe Tax
Favored Treatment 520
C. Motivations for Making Charitable Gifts 522
D. Impact ofPhilanthropy on the Poor 529
E. Charitable Bequest Deduction 532
1. History and Overview 532
2. Private Foundations and Their Resources 532
3. Challenges to the Unlimited Deduction 534
4. The Current Proposal.. 538
F. The Impact ofthe Charitable Bequest Deduction
on the Estate Tax 541
V. WEALTH CONCENTRATION 544
A. BriefHistory 544
B. The Impact ofWealth Concentration and
the Estate Tax 545
C. Proposals to Diminish Wealth Concentration 550
VI. CONCLUSION 557
The test ofour progress is not whether we add more
to the abundance of those who have much; it is
whether we provide enough for those who have too
little.
-Franklin D. Roosevelt l
I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of 2008, the United States was in the midst of an
economic storm. Enduring its worst fmancial state since the Great
Depression, the nation faced a number of significant societal and
industrial problems.i Well-known banks and businesses were fold-
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1937).
2. Short-Term Debt Limit Increase, 111th Cong., (2009) (floor statement
of Kent Conrad, Chairman, S. Budget Comm.) (describing the financial state in
2009 as the worst recession since the Great Depression, on account of record
deficits, a doubling of the national debt, the financial market and housing crises,
ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an unsustainable long term budget),
http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=07c94d52-
f845-41cb-a40f-b28fe9891 a77.
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ing, the housing market was in crisis, and the unemployment rate
had reached a historical high.' While the government endeavored
to deal with the country's economic troubles in a variety of ways,
it should have been more careful in its development of tax policy.
No precise calculus may exist for formulating tax solutions, but the
notion that an effective tax policy can be a helpful aid to economic
recovery should go unquestioned. Unfortunately, recent tax policy
has not reflected the needed concern for the country's economic
predicament. This was especially true with respect to several is-
sues which stemmed from the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act ("EGTRRA") of 2001, also known as the
"Bush tax cutS.,,4
Specifically, because of EGTRRA's sunset provisions, re-
form was necessary to deal with the temporary repeal of the estate
tax scheduled for the 2010 tax year.5 Moreover, reform was need-
ed to respond to EGTRRA's scheduled reinstatement of the 2001
estate tax applicable exclusion amounts in 2011.6 Needless to say,
estate tax reform did not happen prior to 2010, and the timing of
the temporary repeal could not have been worse. In fact, the tim-
ing of the temporary repeal was in direct contradiction to the origi-
nal purpose of the estate tax," Whereas transfer taxes were histori-
cally instated specifically to raise revenue during the country's
financial time of need," the temporary repeal occurred during a
3. Mike Whitney, The Bush Financial Bust of2008: "It's All Downhill
From Here, Folks," CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION (Feb. 8,2008),
http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8033.
4. Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Relief Act of200 I, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.c.). EGTRRA phased out the estate tax and ultimately eliminated it in 2010
through annual reductions, but the tax was automatically reinstated in 2011. See
id. § 901(a)(2), ll5 Stat. 38, 150 ("[T]his Act shall not apply ... to estates of
decedents dying, gifts made, or generation skipping transfers, after December
31,2010.").
5. See id. § 501(a), 115 Stat. 38, 69.
6. See id. § 90l(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150.
7. See Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate
and Gift Taxation, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 875, 881 (2010) (describing occasions when
Congress resorted to estate taxation as emergency measures to raise revenue).
8. See id.
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time when the country could least afford to forego additional reve-
9
nue.
Even now, the economy is in the stages of recovery. While
the estate tax is in situational uncertainty, this is the right time to
focus on its original purpose. Any tax implemented must have a
revenue generating rationale in order to be sustainable, and the
estate tax is not an exception.i" Because the economic state of the
country is still at risk, now is not the time to provide tax breaks to
the wealthy by reducing estate tax obligations through increased
exemptions and reduced rates.
In order to use the estate tax more effectively to raise reve-
nue, the government need only look to the historical treatment of
the estate tax as a foundation to justify imposing an additional tax
burden on the wealthy. In fact, it is especially appropriate to raise
taxes on the economic elite during a financial crisis because these
individuals own a substantial amount of wealth and wealth concen-
tration has contributed to disparities in wealth. II In addition, when
Congress adopted the estate tax as part of the Internal Revenue
Code in 1916, the tax was, in large part, aimed at raising revenue. 12
The additional financial burden of providing an economic
bailout for the country was placed on the propertied, wealthy citi-
zens because they could best afford to provide the additional fund-
ing necessary to sustain the country. This financial burden, along
with other revenue raising measures, was imposed at death when
9. Suzette Lohmeyer, Comparing Economic Security with Unemploy-
ment, Poverty Rates, THE STATE OF THE USA (Aug. 24, 2010, 7:36 AM),
http://www.stateoftheusa.org/content/report-economic-security-slidi.php (noting
that research projections "suggest that in 2009, the level of economic insecurity
experienced by Americans was greater than at any time over the past quarter
century").
10. See David Frederick, Historical Lessons from the Life and Death of
the Federal Estate Tax, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 214 (2007) ("Prior to the
phase out, the estate tax generated $23.1 billion in 1998, and ... $27.4 billion in
2006." (footnote omitted».
11. See infra text accompanying notes 227-90.
12. Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Mak-
ing It Enforceable, 87 B.U. L. REV. 759, 761 n.9 (2007) ("The necessity for [the
estate tax] grows out of the extraordinary increase in the appropriations for the
Army and Navy and the fortification of our country." (alteration in original)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 64-922, at 1 (1916» (internal quotation marks omitted».
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the taxpayer's property was already being transferred. While there
is extensive literature on whether there should even be an estate
tax, there is little discussion as to how tax policy has made the es-
tate tax less effective as a revenue generator and what reform
should be made to reverse that phenomenon. This Article seeks to
change that. In outlining a framework for restoring the estate tax
as an effective supplemental revenue generator, the Article propos-
es three specific methods of reform.
First, appropriate estate tax rates should be implemented,
along with an accompanying appropriate applicable exclusion
amount. 13 Specifically, the estate tax applicable exclusion amount
should be reduced, and the estate tax maximum rate should be in-
creased based on the economic temperature of the country. Con-
gress should only curtail the maximum rate when fiscal needs sub-
side. Second, in order to provide a better incentive for the wealthy
to make lifetime gifts, both the gift tax applicable exclusion
amount and accompanying gift tax rate should be reduced.
Finally, the currently unlimited estate tax charitable bequest
deduction should be modified. Specifically, the charitable bequest
deduction should be revised to model the charitable contribution
limitation deduction set forth under the income tax rules and regu-
lations. As such, the general rule should set the charitable bequest
deduction limitation at 50% of the adjusted gross estate, which is
consistent with the charitable contribution deduction limitation for
income taxation.
Implementing these modifications would create a system
that would foster the multiple purposes of the transfer tax system:
generating revenue, curtailing wealth concentration, and incentiv-
izing charitable giving such that harmony would be restored be-
tween these objectives without having to sacrifice the economic
recovery of the country. By placing limitations on the charitable
bequest deduction, reducing the applicable exclusion amount, and
raising the top marginal rate for the estate tax, revenue may well
increase. This is the type of change the nation should believe in.
This Article will present the proposals as follows: Part II
provides a historical perspective of the estate tax and examines
13. For the purpose of this Article, the terms "appropriate tax rate" and
"appropriate exclusion amount" are figures, which in the author's opinion, bal-
ance government revenue concerns with individual wealth pursuits.
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how the gift tax may make the estate tax more effective. Part III
provides an analysis of transfer taxes as revenue resources and fur-
ther explores how the estate tax may be made more effective. Part
IV provides a historical perspective of the charitable contribution
deduction and the charitable bequest deduction, including an anal-
ysis of where donors contribute. In addition, it reviews justifica-
tions for the limitations on the currently unlimited charitable be-
quest deduction. Part V provides an analysis of wealth concentra-
tion and how it may impact the effectiveness of the estate tax. Part
VI provides the conclusion.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TRANSFER TAXES
A. History ofEstate Taxes
The initial manifestation of the estate tax came in 1797
when the United States needed to raise funds in anticipation of ex-
penses to deal with a military conflict against France. 14 The tax
was enacted in the form of federal tax stamps and was repealed in
1802. 15 Not intended to be a massive revenue-raiser, the tax was
part of a comprehensive tax plan to generate revenue for the gov-
ernment to finance the military conflict. 16 In a similar manner, the
14. Frederick, supra note 10, at 199. During the 1790s, the French had
grown hostile towards the United States because they reopened trade with Great
Britain, France's greatest enemy at the time. Jd.
To combat the French threat, the United States Congress in Ju-
ly 1798 authorized President Adams to increase its naval pow-
er by purchasing new warships and arming merchant vessels,
both at considerable cost. In anticipation of the costs of the
growing conflict with the French, Congress enacted a far
reaching stamp tax to raise revenue.
Jd. (footnote omitted).
15. PATRICK FLEENOR, TAX FOUND., A HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF
ESTATE TAXES IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1994), http://
www.taxfoundation.orglfileslf7c34848582a114133f90711b50b9a3a.pdf. "[T]he
Stamp Act of 1797 ... required that federal tax stamps be purchased when trans-
ferring property from an estate." Jd. The price of the stamp was directly related
to the value of the property being transferred from an estate. Jd.
16. Frederick, supra note 10, at 199. This early death tax was not de-
signed as an independent revenue raising provision,
but instead fit into a larger picture of taxing a wide array of le-
gal documents, as was common in the laws of England. The
stamp tax was therefore not an attempt to impose a heavy tax
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transfer tax was reborn during the Civil War to address the finan-
cial concerns of the nation. Once again, the primary purpose be-
hind the tax was to finance the war. 17 While the Civil War was
undoubtedly a source of economic stress for the country," tax pol-
icy was used to generate additional revenue for the nation's mili-
tary pursuits.
When the anticipated amount of revenue fell short, howev-
er, Congress responded by increasing some of the tax rates and
implementing the gift tax as a backstop to prevent the wealthy
from avoiding a tax altogether by gifting the property during their
lifetimes. 19 Used in this fashion, the estate tax served as a source
for generating revenue on the basis of governmental need, demon-
strating the estate tax has the ability to raise revenue effectively
without having to serve as the primary source of the nation's reve-
nue. As Congress had in past times, the estate tax was once again
repealed after the financial necessity had dissipated.i"
Under the Revenue Act of 1916, the estate tax was again
reinstated because of the government's anticipated need for reve-
nue.21 With the entrance into World War I impending, revenue
was needed to fund the country's war costs.22 Moreover, even
though the estate tax was only reinstated as a supporting source of
burden on the passage of wealth between generations and the
death tax was quite simple, without a complex system of ex-
emptions and credits.
Id. (footnote omitted).
17. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A
Modern Crisis in Historical Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 844 (2006).
18. See Casualties and Costs of the Civil War, DIGITAL RIST.,
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.eduJhistoryonline/us20.cfm (last updated Apr. 12,
2012) (noting that the cost of the Civil War was approximately $6.8 billion, and
was one of the most costly wars in history for our nation).
19. Frederick, supra note 10, at 200. See infra Part n.B for a more de-
tailed discussion regarding the role ofthe gift tax.
20. Frederick, supra note 10, at 200.
21. ld. at 205.
22. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Materialism, 83
IND. LJ. 881, 903 (2008) ("Nearly every facet of American life, including the
federal tax system, was dramatically altered by the war. Beginning with the
Revenue Act of 1916, which significantly increased income tax rates, enacted a
graduated estate tax, and imposed an innovative war profits tax on certain busi-
nesses, the World War I revenue acts radically redirected American fiscal policy
...." (footnote omitted)).
500 The University ofMemphis Law Review Vol. 42
revenue to the individual income tax, the reinstatement marked a
tum in history for the transfer tax system.r" Similar to past periods
of economic crises when the United States had been involved in or
was about to enter a military conflict, our government strategically
used the estate tax to address imminent financial needs of the
country." When coupled with other revenue raising measures
such as the income tax, the estate tax proved to be an effective tool
at generating the kind of capital necessary to restore the econo-
my.25
In fact, during the period following World War I, prosperi-
ty flourished." Such prosperity suggests that the estate tax has the
potential to be a. valuable tool for raising revenue when used
properly and effectively.f Very simply, by increasing the estate
tax on the wealthiest citizens, Congress can address the economic
stresses of the country without placing an undue burden on indi-
vidual wealth pursuits.
Unlike times past, however, the end of World War I did not
result in the end of the estate tax. While a repeal of the tax would
have naturally resulted after the war if the tax's only purpose was
to finance the military conflict, context reveals that raising revenue
was no longer the primary motivator for imposing the estate tax.
In fact, by the end of the war, the progressive movement in Ameri-
ca had gained enough political support to shift the focus of the es-
23. FLEENOR, supra note 15, at 5.
24. Frederick, supra note 10, at 199-200 (detailing the use of the estate
tax during the "Undeclared War" with France in the 1790s, the Civil War, and
the Spanish-American War).
25. Id. at 200 ("The central historical lesson from these forerunners to the
modem estate tax is simple: a death tax can be an effective and relatively un-
controversial tool for raising substantial revenue in a time of financial crisis,
especially war.").
26. See Cooper, supra note 7, at 885 ("Between 1921 and 1928, the num-
ber of Americans with annual incomes over $1,000,000 increased from 21 to
511, while the number earning between $500,000 and $1,000,000 annually in-
creased from 63 to 983.").
27. See Frederick, supra note 10, at 200-01 ("The 1898 death tax raised
nearly $22.5 million in four short years. Adjusted for inflation, these totals be-
come $184 million and $525 million, respectively, in the year 2006. Such col-
lections can have a significant impact on a financial crisis, especially when cou-
pled with other revenue producing measures such as income taxes and property
taxes." (footnotes omitted)).
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tate tax from revenue generator to an instrument to combat wealth
concentration.f With the Revenue Act of 1916 established as the
permanent source of the estate tax, this new progressive focus be-
gan to significantly diminish the estate tax's status as an effective
revenue generator.
The nation's post-war prosperity came to a screeching halt
in 1929 when the stock market crashed and the country entered
into the Great Depression.i" The country was at its economic
worst during this time period, as millions of people became unem-
ployed, businesses failed, and banks closed.i" Although raising
taxes was probably not the government's first choice to deal with
the situation, the country was in dire straits. Drastic action was
necessary; the government needed a reliable revenue source.
Consequently, the government's need for a solution only
intensified as the country's economic picture became bleaker. As
other measures were considered and rejected by Congress or failed
once implemented, tax policy was relied upon to deal with the fi-
nancial crisis created by the Great Depression.3I Challenged to
find a balance between addressing the rising deficit without sacri-
ficing the economic growth of the country or its citizens.V the
28. See infra text accompanying notes 227-90 for further discussion on
wealth concentration.
29. See Frederick, supra note 10, at 206.
30. See Cooper, supra note 7, at 878 n.3 ("Between 1929 and 1932, the
U.S. economy 'went into a fatal tailspin' as some 5,000 banks and 50,000 other
businesses went bankrupt, unemployment rates soared from 3% to 25% and
manufacturing activity declined by more than 50%." (citing DON NARDO,
TURNING POINTS IN WORLD HISTORY-THE GREAT DEPRESSION 3, 13 (Don
Nardo ed., 2000»).
31. See id. at 878-88. Congress entertained the notion of a national sales
tax. !d. at 886. Congress also entertained the idea of borrowing the funds to
finance the government but ultimately concluded that the United States was
already highly leveraged and any more borrowing might weaken the U.S. dollar,
thereby exacerbating the problem. Id. at 889.
32. See generally Chaka Fattah, Essay, Deja Vu All Over Again: Reexam-
ining Fundamental Tax Reform and Evaluating the Feasibility ofa Transaction
Tax in the 11lth Congress, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327,336-338 (201O)(discuss-
ing the policy concerns underlying the New Deal); see also Anne L. Alstott &
Ben Novick, War, Taxes, and Income Redistribution in the Twenties: The 1924
Veterans' Bonus and the Defeat ofthe Mellon Plan, 59 TAX L. REv. 373, 373-
74 (2006) (providing background information regarding the expansion of the
income tax and social programs).
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government ultimately raised taxes. In addition to using income
taxes, both individual and corporate, transfer taxes were used to
generate additional revenue.'"
Under the Revenue Act of 1932, the top marginal rate for
the estate tax was increased to 45%, and the applicable exclusion
amount was reduced from $100,000 to $50,000. 34 By 1934, the
top marginal rate was further increased to 60%, and by the time
World War II started, the top marginal rate was increased to over
70%.35 By increasing the number of estates subject to taxation,
increasing the amount includable per taxable estate, and adding
additional kinds of property subject to taxation, the government
increased revenue." For example, between 1930 and 1939, the
estate tax raised $2.1 billion, and with the benefit of amendments
and increases through World War II, it raised an additional $2.35
billion from 1941 to 1945.37
After the financial crisis ended, raising revenue had again
become a secondary objective for the estate tax. While other forms
of taxation made adjustments to continue the revenue raising ob-
jective as time passed, the estate tax was not able to maintain the
same pace." In fact, the estate tax rates and applicable exclusion
amounts remained stagnant for many years, thereby becoming less
of a factor in the federal tax collections over time.39 Furthermore,
there is little evidence that the estate tax, as it was being used, had
any impact on decreasing wealth concentration.
33. Frederick, supra note 10, at 206-207. Part of this specific taxation
plan raised the top marginal rate and reinstated the gift tax. ld. at 206.
34. Cooper, supra note 7, at 898 tbl. 1.
35. David Joulfaian, The Federal Estate Tax: History, Law, and Econom-
ics 2-3 (Jan. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.comlsoI3/papers.cfm?abstractjd=1579829 (click "One-Click
Download" to view PDF version).
36. Cooper, supra note 7, at 896-97. The Revenue Act of 1932 accom-
plished the base-broadening for the estate tax by implementing the following
methods: increased tax rates, narrowed tax brackets, and a reduced exemption.
ld. The changes "exposed thousands of previously nontaxable estates to estate
taxation ... [and] produced a ripple effect, as all estates above [a certain] level
were subject to estate taxation on a larger proportion of their assets." Id. at 897.
37. Frederick, supra note 10, at 206-07.
38. Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 2-2 to -3.
39. See id. at 6-7 tbl. 6.3. The estate tax applicable exclusion amount
remained at $60,000 from 1942 until 1977. Id.
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Nevertheless, when compared to other federal revenue
sources, the estate tax has made important contributions to the
country as a revenue source.i" By reviewing in more detail how
the estate tax has served as a supplemental revenue source for the
government, one can glean how to more effectively use the estate
tax in that respect. Yet, before fully discussing how to successful-
ly utilize the estate tax, it is prudent to first mention the role of the
gift tax and how it may be used more effectively in a transfer tax
system.
B. Role ofthe Gift Tax
With the imposition of an estate tax looming on transfers at
death, the obvious solution to avoid estate taxation would be to
make as many lifetime gifts as possible. To close this loophole,
however, Congress has consistently enacted legislation which hin-
ders such strategic planning. For example, under the Revenue Act
of 1924, Congress instated the gift taX.41 Although the tax was
repealed a short two years later,42 the country was in desperate
need of revenue after the Great Depression.
To help raise funds, the government again turned to tax
policy. The gift tax was reinstated as part of the Revenue Act of
1932, closely mirroring the income and estate tax in many as-
peers." Although the applicable exclusion amount for the gift tax
was the same as that of the estate tax, the top marginal gift tax rate
was set at 75% of the top marginal rate set for the estate tax.44
Moreover, while the gift tax was reinstated during a time when the
country needed additional financial resources, there is no claim
that the gift tax was intended to be an independent revenue genera-
40. Frederick, supra note 10, at 214 ("Moreover, if the estate tax were to
be collected more stringently, without such measures as high initial exemptions
and a progressive rate schedule, it could generate even more revenue. The mon-
ey raised by the estate tax is not intrinsically insignificant and the tax by no
means lacks substantial revenue potential.").
41. Cooper, supra note 7, at 883.
42. Id.
43. FLEENOR, supra note 15, at 6. "The tax was due annually," and the
marginal tax rate and exemption amount were based on cumulative gifts made.
ld. The gift tax made allowances for tax free gifts. ld.
44. ld. at 6 fig. 2.
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tor.45 Instead, the gift tax was designed to backstop the estate tax
and prevent the wealthy from avoiding the estate tax through inter
vivos gifts." In addition, the gift tax provided a disincentive for
the wealthy to make gifts of income-producing property to family
members in a lower income tax bracket.47
By implementing a gift tax rate at 75% of the estate tax
rate, it is clear that Congress did not intend to make the gift tax
punitive and may have even intended to encourage inter vivos
gifts." After all, a gift tax can raise revenue immediately rather
than waiting until death, as required under an estate tax. With the
gift tax rate set at 75% of the estate tax rate and the tax base only
including the value of the property actually transferred, the trans-
feror has the motivation and opportunity to transfer wealth inter
vivos at a reduced cost.49 The cost is reduced because of the tax-
exclusive nature of the gift tax as opposed to the tax-inclusive na-
ture of the estate tax.50
45. See Gans & Soled, supra note 12, at 761 ("Congress designed [the
gift tax] to protect the integrity of the estate tax and income tax.").
46. /d. at 761-62.
47. /d. at 762-63.
48. Cooper, supra note 7, at 912. If wealthy taxpayers could be induced
to make gifts, then revenue generated as a result of the gift would be due the
following year, the same as the income tax. Because making a gift is a volun-
tary act, there had to be an incentive for the person to make the gift, ergo the
reduced tax rate for the transferred property. Id.
49. Id. ("Congress fully realized that this approach would provide
wealthy taxpayers with a significant opportunity to reduce their overall tax bur-
den but were willing to do so as a means of generating immediate federal reve-
nue.").
50. Phyllis C. Smith, The Estate and Gift Tax Implications ofSelf-Settled
Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Can You Really Have Your Cake and Eat It
Too? 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 25, 44 (2009) ("The effective rate refers to the fact
that the gift tax is 'tax exclusive,' and therefore the applicable tax is payable on
the actual amount of the gift transferred, and the transferor will use other assets
to pay the tax owed. On the other hand, the estate tax is 'tax inclusive' in that
the assets used to pay the tax are included in the calculation to determine the
applicable tax, so fewer assets are ultimately transferred." (footnote omitted));
see also REGIS W. CAMPFIELD ETAL., TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS & TRUSTS
12 (23rd ed. 2006). See generally Kerry A. Ryan, Human Capital and Transfer
Taxation, 62 OKLA. L. REv. 223 (2010) (discussing in detail other salient fea-
tures of the gift tax).
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Importantly, by receiving the revenue generated from the
gift tax upfront, the government would, in tum, receive less reve-
nue from the estate at the transferor's death from a transfer tax per-
spective. Considering the time value of money, the current reve-
nue generated by the gift tax may well be more valuable than the
anticipated revenue generated later through the estate. Conse-
quently, the gift tax serves multiple purposes, not only as a back-
stop to the income and estate tax, but also as a revenue generator."
Moreover, by unifying the applicable exclusion amount
with the estate tax and reducing the general rate of taxation, the
government was able to bridge the gap to generate more revenue
and preserve some of the estate tax base. Current tax policy should
not lose sight of such success. By heeding tax policy measures
used in prior government administrations, the government can en-
deavor to make the current system generate more revenue. Con-
sider, for example, the current gift tax applicable exclusion
amount. While the measure is temporary, the gift tax applicable
exclusion amount is currently unified with the estate tax at $5 mil-
lion.52 This gift tax exclusion amount exceeds the appropriate lev-
el, and as such, both the estate tax and gift tax applicable exclusion
amounts should be reduced. Moreover, the gift tax rate should be
70% of the estate tax rate.53
III. TRANSFER TAXES AS SOURCES OF REVENUE
A. Role ofthe Estate Tax as a Source ofRevenue
The role of the estate tax as a source of revenue is well-
established in the United States. Historically, the estate tax has
been used to raise revenue when the country's financial needs have
been great. For example, in anticipation of the expenses needed to
51. See generally Gans & Soled, supra note 12 (providing a detailed
discussion regarding enforcement and other reforms which make the gift tax
even more effective at raising revenue and protecting the income and estate tax
systems).
52. The estate and gift transfer taxes were decoupled in 200 I pursuant to
EGTRRA. The transfer taxes were unified again in 2010 and set to remain so
until December 31, 2012, as a result of Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat.
3296 (codified in scattered section of26 U.S.C.).
53. See infra Part llI.e.
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fund World War 1, Congress implemented what became the per-
manent estate tax in 1916; since that time, with exception of brief
periods of repeal, transfer taxes have been important sources of
revenue for the federal govemment." In 1918 alone, the govern-
ment raised about 1.3% of the total federal revenue from transfer
taxes.55
Of course, the income tax has always been the primary tax
relied upon to generate revenue. Unless the estate tax applicable
exclusion amounts were significantly reduced to include virtually
all estates, the income tax pool would undoubtedly always exceed
the estate tax pool. In addition, because of the reliance on the in-
dividual income tax to generate substantial revenue on an annual
basis, the estate tax was never intended to become a major source
of revenue.56
Be that as it may, the estate tax has still served an important
purpose in the revenue raising agenda. For instance, during the
years of the Great Depression, the estate tax applicable exclusion
amount was reduced, and the tax rate was increased on both the
estate and gift tax in order to collect additional revenue.57 Togeth-
er, these transfer taxes garnered almost $379 million in 1936, an
amount equaling almost 10% of the federal revenue raised during
the year." Such revenue reflected the highest percentage of feder-
al receipts the estate tax has ever collected, a feat especially signif-
54. Darien B. Jacobson et aI., The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Count-
ing, SOl BULLETIN, Summer 2007, at 188, 118, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soilninetyestate.pdf. The gift transfer tax was introduced in 1924 but then re-
pealed in 1926. !d. at 121 fig. C. The gift tax was re-instated in 1932 and has
become a permanent part of the taxing system since that time. See id.
55. FLEENOR, supra note 15, at 11.
56. CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 4130, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET
OUTLOOK 53 (2010), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/l15xx/doc1l579/06-30-
ltbo.pdf (indicating that the federal income tax accounts for 85% of the federal
government's revenue and that the total federal government revenue has ranged
from 15% to 21% of the gross domestic product over the past 40 years).
57. FLEENOR, supra note 15, at 5-6. The Great Depression and the up-
coming conflict of World War II would lead to additional economic demands on
the federal budget between 1930 and 1940. The years between 1932 and 1941
represented the highest revenue receipts for estate taxes because Congress raised
the tax rates and reduced the exemption levels. Id. at 6.
58. Id. at II; Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 6-1.
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icant considering the country was suffering through its worst eco-
nomic times.59
While the transfer tax system may not be the first choice
for dealing with a budget shortfall, the government has consistently
used the transfer tax system to augment the budget in a significant
way. Doing so is quite sensible, for after one considers that hun-
dreds of billions of dollars in wealth are estimated to pass at death
each year, it is clear that an estate tax has the potential to be of
high utility.60 In fact, in one year, it was reported that the United
States government collected almost $24 billion in transfer taxes."
With such success being evident, the only remaining query is
whether the tax may be used more effectively to tap some of these
estate assets in order to fund government programs or deal with the
rising deficit.62 In light of the amount of wealth that is transferred,
it is remarkable that only a small fraction of it becomes revenue for
the federal government. 63
Although there was a short period of time during the estate
tax's history when the amount of federal receipts increased, those
receipts soon declined and have, in general, continued to decline
ever since." A combination of factors may be attributed to this
poor revenue generation from the estate tax. The primary reason
for such poor performance has ironically, or intentionally, been tax
policy. Tax policy has impacted the amount subject to taxation,
59. FLEENOR, supra note 15, at 6; see also Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 6-
5 tbl. 6.1 (providing a record of the _government's estate and gift tax revenues
from 1917-2009).
60. See Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv.
69, 72 (1990) (indicating $150 billion passes at death each year); see also
Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 6-5 tbl. 6.1 (noting that approximately $229 billion
was transferred in 2001).
61. Martha Britton Eller, Which Estates Are Affected by the Federal Es-
tate Tax?: An Examination of the Filing Population for Year-of-Death 2001,
SOl BULLETIN, Summer 2005, at 1, 3, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
0lesyod.pdf ("[D]ecedents owned more than $229 billion in total assets and
reported almost $23.7 billion in net estate tax liability.").
62. Ascher, supra note 60 at 72 (discussing the fact that billions of dollars
still pass at death each year).
63. See Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 6-5 tbl. 6.1 (showing revenue gener-
ated from estates has been less than 3% of total federal receipts collected since
1942).
64. See id.
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the rate of taxation, and the amount ultimately receivable by the
government; when these issues are analyzed over time, one can
accurately trace how the estate tax's revenue raising capability has
been severely inhibited.
B. Tax Policy Changes That Inhibit the Estate Tax's Potential to
Raise Revenue
While predicting the precise impact of tax policy changes is
not an easy enterprise, it is oftentimes clear which measures will
generally result in additional revenue for the government. For ex-
ample, in the period between 1932 and 1940, tax policy changes
were clearly designed to raise revenue. Over the course of that
period, the applicable exclusion amount was reduced to as low as
$40,000, an amount lower than even the inception level.65
Through these tax changes, the government was able to increase
the pool of estates subject to the tax, thereby raising additional rev-
enue.
As a result of the tax policy changes, over 13,000 estate tax
returns were filed in 1936,66 the same year the estate tax generated
approximately 10% of total receipts collected by the federal gov-
ernment.67 Because the country was in the middle of the Great
Depression and the government's need for revenue was serious,
Congress responded by imposing tax increases, not reductions. As
a matter of public policy, the country's need for revenue out-
weighed individual wealth concerns.
The $40,000 applicable exclusion amount remained static
until 1942, when $60,000 was implemented as the new applicable
exclusion amount.68 This led to an increase in the number of estate
tax returns filed between 1942 and 1977, and the $60,000 applica-
ble exclusion amount remained in place through 1976.69 At that
time, a new major tax act was implemented.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 ("TRA 1976,,)/° which took
effect in 1977, lowered the estate tax top marginal rate and doubled
65. See id. at 2-6 tbl. 2.1.
66. Jd. at 4-4 tbl. 4.1.
67. Id. at 6-1.
68. !d. at 2-6 tbl. 2.1.
69. Id. at 4-4 tbl. 4.1, 6-7 tbl. 6.3.
70. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of26 U.S.c.).
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the estate tax applicable exclusion amount." In addition, it unified
the estate and gift tax.72 Considered comprehensively, TRA 1976
amounted to a substantial tax break and therefore a reduction in
revenue generated for the government. 73
Moreover, as the changes took effect, the number of trans-
fer tax returns filed decreased significantly." In the years leading
up to TRA 1976, the number of estate tax returns filed increased
annually. 75 Between the years 1977 and 1981, however, the num-
ber of transfer tax returns filed decreased by more than 45%.76
Interestingly, despite the fact that the amount of returns decreased,
the amount of revenue generated decreased in the first year but
then held steady, averaging around $6 billion per year; nonethe-
less, the overall share of receipts decreased. 77
TRA 1976 also provided for incremental increases of the
estate tax applicable exclusion amount. As such, the applicable
71. Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 2-4.
72. /d. (discussing that TRA 1976 lowered the maximum estate tax re-
form rate from 77% to 70%, raised the exemption amount from $60,000 to
$120,666, integrated the estate and gift tax under the Unified Transfer Tax, and
modified the estate and gift taxes such that they were complemented with the
generation skipping transfer tax, which was implemented to reduce tax avoid-
ance by generation skipping transfers); see also FLEENOR, supra note 15, at 7
("Unification of these provisions kept the cumulative nature of the gift tax and
treated distributions from a decedent's estate as the final transfer.").
73. See Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 6-5 tbl. 6.1 (showing that in 1977, the
estate tax generated 2.06% of the total federal receipts collected by the govern-
ment, whereas the tax generated only 1.32% of total federal receipts the follow-
ing year, amounting to a nominal reduction of approximately $2 billion and a
reduction in approximately $9 billon in real money).
74. FLEENOR, supra note 15, at 9 (arguing that this significant decrease
"occurred because increases in the unified credit effectively raised the amount of
the exemption six-fold").
75. Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 4-4 tbl. 4.1 (noting that in 1971, the num-
ber of estate tax returns filed was approximately 149,432, but by 1977, that
number had increased to as high as 248,316).
76. FLEENOR, supra note 15, at 9.
77. See Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 6-5 tbl. 6.1. In 1977, the estate tax
generated over $7 billion, and in the following year, the revenue had decreased
to just over $5 billion. Id. Between the years 1979 and 1981, the revenue gen-
erated increased from $5.4 billion up to $6.8 billion. Id. In tum, the annual
share of federal receipts was 2.06% in 1977 and decreased to 1.13% by 1981.
Id.
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exclusion amount increased from 1977 until the next major tax act,
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA 1981").78 With
the passage of ERTA 1981, tax breaks were only heightened. The
estate tax rate was reduced, the applicable exclusion amount was
increased, and an unlimited marital deduction was introduced.79
These factors contributed to further reducing the revenue potential
of the transfer tax system. 80
Over time, legislative trends have served to limit the estate
tax's ability to secure revenue for the federal government. As
Congress has continued to reduce the top marginal rate and raise
the applicable exclusion amount, estates that were once taxable no
longer are." In fact, five years after ERTA 1981 was implement-
ed, the number of estate tax returns had reduced by more than
50%.82
78. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of26 U.S.c.).
79. Jou1faian, supra note 35, at 2-4. Prior to ERTA 1981, the marital
deduction was limited to the greater of $250,000 or 50% of the adjusted gross
estate. Id. at 3-4. The unlimited marital deduction was introduced primarily to
place separate property and community property spouses in parity for tax pur-
poses regarding property transferred between spouses at death; by treating the
property owned by a husband and wife as one taxing unit for transfer tax pur-
poses, the tax treatment between similarly situated spouses would be equalized.
Id.
80. See id. at 2-4, 6-2. Between 1981 and 1985, the maximum rate was
reduced incrementally from 70% down to 50%. Id. at 2-4. The exemption
amount increased from approximately $175,000 up to $400,000. See id. at 6-7
tbl. 6.3. Between 1985 and 1997, the maximum rate was frozen at 55%, id. at 2-
10 tbl. 2.5., and the exemption amount was further increased from $400,000 to
$600,000. See id. at 6-7 tbl. 6.3. The estate tax share of the total government
collections hovered just above 1% and never made it above the 2% mark. See
id. 6-5 tbl. 6.1. In nominal dollars, the revenue generated between 1981 and
1985 remained around $6 billion per year, and between 1985 and 1997, the dol-
lars generated per year increased up to as high as $19.8 billion. Id. It is worth
noting that the revenue increase during this time span is in part a reflection of
the deferral of estate taxes coming due because of the unlimited marital deduc-
tion; moreover, the national economy was especially strong during the early
1990s.
81. See FLEENOR, supra note 15, at 7 fig. 3 (indicating a reduction in
transfer tax returns since the mid-1970s).
82. See Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 4-4 tbl. 4.1. In 1981, 145,617 estate
tax returns were filed, and in the following year, that number reduced to
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Further changes occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("OBRA") of
1987,83 Congress extended the provisions for the top marginal rates
for five years which delayed the onset of tax reductions due in ac-
cordance with ERTA 1981.84 As a result, while Congress intended
to reduce the top marginal rate to 50% under TRA 1986, Congress
instead retroactively extended the rate at 55% under the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993.85 After these tax provisions, the num-
ber of estate tax returns filed increased between 1989 and 1997.86
With the passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
("TRA 1997"), the estate tax applicable exclusion amount was
scheduled to increase again over a course of time and reach $1 mil-
lion by 2006.87 Undoubtedly, the estate tax became less of a factor
as a revenue generator with these changes, but when relating back
to the original purpose of the estate tax, this was not entirely prob-
lematic. The changes occurred during a time when the economy
was still booming, and as such, the estate tax was not needed to
134,965. Id. By 1986, the estate tax returns filed had plummeted to 71,518. [d.
In 1988, 52,364 estate tax returns were filed, the lowest number of filings since
1959. Id. In 1981, the revenue generated was approximately $6.8 billion, total-
ing 1.13% of federal receipts. [d. at 6-5 tbl. 6.1. By 1988, the revenue generat-
ed had increased to $7.6 billion, but the share of total receipts had decreased to
.84%, lower than it had ever been since 1918. Id.
83. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections ofD.S.C.).
84. FLEENOR, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that although "The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 had intended to lower all marginal transfer tax rates
below 50 percent by 1985," the "1987 Act[] postponed implementation of this
provision until January 1,1993," holding the top marginal rate at 55%).
85. Id. at 9-10; see Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of26 U.S.c.).
86. Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 4-4 tbl. 4.1. In 1989, the number of estate
tax returns filed was 54,700. Id. By 1997, the number of estate tax filings had
increased to 97,267. Id. In 1989, the estate tax generated $8.7 billion, which
represented .88% of the federal receipts collected. Id. at 6-5 tbl. 6.1. Between
1990 and 1997, the revenue generated continued to increase resulting in nearly
$20 billion in revenue for the 1997 year, an amount which equaled 1.26% of the
total federal receipts collected. Id.
87. Id. at 2-5 (stating that the applicable exclusion amount level was in-
creased annually until the applicable exclusion amount reached the 2006 maxi-
mum of$1 million); see Pub. L. No. 105-34 III Stat. 788 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of26 U.S.C.).
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generate substantial revenue; in fact, there was a budget surplus.88
Even so, after the passage of TRA 1997, the number of estate tax
returns increased, in addition to the amount of revenue generated.89
While TRA 1997 signaled an important shift in tax policy,
the most significant tax changes occurred with EGTRRA. In ac-
cordance with EGTRRA, the applicable exclusion amount was
increased, and the top marginal tax rates were further reduced."
Moreover, EGTRRA provided for a sunset of its provisions in
2009, with an estate tax repeal scheduled for 2010.91
As the changes in tax policy have been consistently de-
signed to reduce estate tax obligations over time, it is no surprise
that the estate tax has not generated revenue as well as its income
tax counterpart.Y Yet, notwithstanding the policies which have
inhibited revenue growth, the estate tax has still produced useful
revenue for the government. In fact, between 2001 and 2009, the
estate tax generated over $233 billion.93 With the modifications
proposed by this Article, the government has the potential to gen-
88. Earl Blumenauer, Business Law Forum Taxation and the Environ-
ment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 315,316 (2011) ("The last half of the admin-
istration of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton's first two years brought dra-
matic reductions in spending coupled with tax increases. These budget cuts and
new revenues ushered in eight years of declining deficits, culminating in three
consecutive years of budget surpluses." (footnote omitted)).
89. See Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 4-4 tbl. 4.1,6-5 tbl. 6.1. By 1998, the
revenue generated reached over $24 billion, representing 1.40% of the federal
receipts collected. Id. at 6-5 tbl. 6.1. By 2001, the revenue collected increased
to over $28 billion, representing 1.42% of the total federal receipts. Id.
90. Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Relief Act of200 I, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, § 501(a), 115 Stat. 38, 69 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.). In accordance with EGTRRA, the applicable exclusion amount
was set at $1 million for the years 2002-2003, $1.5 million for the years 2004-
2005, $2 million for the years 2006-2008, and $3.5 million for 2009. Id. The
maximum tax rate decreased incrementally over the course of the same years.
See id. In 2002, the maximum rate was 50%, 49% in 2003, 48% in 2004, 47%
in 2005, 46% in 2006, and 45% for 2007-2009. Id.
91. Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 2-5.
92. See id. at 6-5 tbl. 6.1. In 2002, the estate tax generated over $26 bil-
lion, representing 1.43% of the federal receipts collected. Id. By the year 2009,
the estate tax generated over $23 billion, representing 1.12% of the federal re-
ceipts. Id.
93. See id.
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erate hundreds ofbillions-ifnot trillions--of dollars over the next
decade.
C. Change We Can't Believe In or Afford
It should be clear that the recent changes to our estate tax
are not the kind of changes we can afford. First, by passing
EGTRRA, the government sent a distinct message that the estate
tax would have a decreasing role in generating revenue. In fact, at
the time of EGTRRA's passage, many speculated that the repeal of
the estate tax would soon follow. The sunset provisions in 2009,
which scheduled a temporary repeal for 2010, certainly bolstered
the political discourse.
When passing EGTRRA, however, the lawmakers did not
anticipate the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In past years where military conflict
ensued, an accompanying increase in tax liability followed to pay
for anticipated costs; this was especially so with the estate tax.94
Yet, when this nation encountered huge financial obligations aris-
ing out of its conflict with both Afghanistan and Iraq, tax breaks,
not tax increases, were the norm." As a result, the wars signifi-
cantly increased the nation's spending and saddled it with substan-
tial debt.96
By failing to act on the sunset provisions of EGTRRA, the
lawmakers allowed the 2010 estate tax repeal to transpire, exacer-
bating the budget shortfall. This failure to take action is almost
egregious considering that the country was in the heart of a great. _
94. Frederick, supra note 10, at 199-200. (detailing the use of the estate
tax during the "Undeclared War" with France in the 1790s, the Civil War, and
the Spanish-American War).
95. See Paul L. Caron, The Costs ofEstate Tax Dithering, 43 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 637, 647 (2010) (noting that efforts to repeal the estate tax "reached
their apogee during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan").
96. See CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 56, at 10. See generally
CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, CHANGES IN CBO's BASELINE PROJECTIONS SINCE
JANUARY 2001 (2011), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/docI2187/Changes
BaselineProjections.pdf ("In January 2001, CBO's baseline projections showed
a cumulative surplus of $5.6 trillion for the 2002-2011 period. The actual re-
sults have differed from those projections because of subsequent policy changes,
economic developments that differed from CBO's forecast, and other factors...
. CBO estimates [] a swing of $11.8 trillion from the January 2001 projec-
tions.").
514 The University ofMemphis Law Review Vol. 42
economic recession." Historically, this would have been the per-
fect time to not only ensure an estate tax was in place, but also to
raise the top marginal rate and reduce the exemption, an amount
which had just increased in 2009 from $2 million to $3.5 million.98
Instead, lawmakers did the opposite through their inaction and lost
the opportunity to raise much needed revenue.f" Because Congress
failed to prevent the repeal, 2010 marked the first year the country
did not have an estate tax in almost one hundred years. 100
Consider the case of a singular estate. In March of 2010, a
multi-billionaire from Texas died, leaving a substantial portion of
his estate to his wife and children.l'" Even under normal circum-
stances, this would be newsworthy, but what makes the timing of
his death more intriguing is the fact it occurred during a year in
which the estate tax had been temporarily repealed. 102 As a result
of the timing, billions of dollars that may have been payable to the
u.s. Treasury because of estate taxation were lost. Moreover, be-
cause the assets transferred through the billionaire's estate were
97. James Sunshine, The Great Recession: Is It Time for a Name
Change? HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2011, 6:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com!20 11107/26/great-recession-name-change_n_
908640.html#s315744&title=George_W_Bush ("In 2008, then-President George
W. Bush announced that America was in the process of what he called an eco-
nomic 'slowdown.' But by as early as that December, a new term to describe the
weak economy had entered the public lexicon: The Great Recession.").
98. See Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Relief Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 521(a), 115 Stat. 38, 71 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of26 U.S.c.).
99. Miller Johnson, Estate Tax Repeal Presents Planning Challenges and
Problems, MARTINDALE.COM (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.martindale.com!
trusts-estates-Iaw/article_Miller-Johnson_91 1758.htm ("The failure of Congress
to act before the end of 2009 resulted in [the] estate tax repeal, but only for peo-
ple who die[d] in 2010.").
100. Cf Cooper, supra note 7, at 881-82 (noting that prior to the imple-
mentation of the permanent estate tax in 1916, the last estate tax was repealed in
1902).
101. David Kocieniewski, Legacy for One Billionaire: Death but No Tax-
es, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, at AI, available at http://www.nytimes.com!
2010/06/09/business/0gestate.html?_F I&scp= 1&sq=dan%20duncan%20Ieaves
%20estate&st=cse.
102. See Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Relief Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901(a), 115 Stat. 38,150.
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not subject to the estate tax, they will not likely be subject to an
estate tax until the death of his children. 103
Another noteworthy example is that of the George
Steinbrenner estate, which was estimated at over $1 billion.104
Because the estate tax was repealed at the time of Mr. Steinbren-
ner's death, the government received no revenue from his estate
upon the transfer of property from the estate to beneficiaries. l05 As
a result, the estate is estimated to have saved at least $500 million
in estate taxes. 106
Unfortunately, the 2010 repeal of the estate tax is not the
only recent shortcoming of American tax policy. Another failure
of our lawmakers came about as a result of the political "punt"
represented by the 2011 Economic Stimulus Package ("ESp,,).107
In this package, the estate tax exemption was increased to $5 mil-
lion, and the gift tax exemption was concomitantly unified at $5
103. Because of the temporary repeal, the decedent had the ability to trans-
fer the entire estate, less a life estate to the surviving spouse, to the children,
allowing the assets to be shielded from estate taxation until the death of his chil-
dren. Under normal circumstances, he would have had the ability to shield the
applicable exclusion amount from estate taxation, and the remaining estate
would be not be taxed, if devised to the surviving spouse, because of the unlim-
ited marital deduction if compliant with I.R.C. § 2056(b )(7) (2006). However,
upon the surviving spouse's death, the assets would be taxable to the surviving
spouse's estate because of the required inclusion in her estate according to
I.R.C. § 2044 (2006). As a result of dying in the year 20 I0, the decedent did not
have to comply with I.R.c. § 2056(b)(7) to leave his spouse a life estate; there-
fore, the estate may escape estate taxation at the death of the decedent and his
surviving spouse.
104. David Kozo, Yankees Owner George Steinbrenner Dies, WALL ST. J.,
July 14, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870451890457
5364850058726956.htrnl.
105. This reference is limited strictly to estate taxes, not related income
taxes that may be incurred upon the sale of the property from the estate.
106. Brad Hamilton & Jeane MacIntosh, Death'S Perfect Timing Saves
Kin HalfBil in Taxes, N.Y. POST, July 14, 2010, at 9, available at
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/death---'perfect_timing_NusLyGIMu8cn8ky
epprVJP.
107. The source of the stimulus package lies in the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.), amended by Tax Relief, Unemploy-
ment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
312,124 Stat 3296.
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million. IDS Not only were these exemption amounts too much giv-
en the economic climate of the country, but by making the new tax
package temporary, a proposed permanent estate tax repeal re-
mained at the forefront of the political discourse on tax policy.
While ESP is scheduled to sunset in two years, estate tax li-
ability was reduced significantly for the wealthiest Americans dur-
ing a time when the country was still suffering economically.l'"
Although historically the transfer tax system has been used effec-
tivelyas a mechanism to raise revenue during times of economic
crisis, our lawmakers made a decision to forego the additional rev-
enue when they decreased individuals' financial obligations. This
decision was unwise.
Instead of punting, the lawmakers should have seized the
opportunity to make changes benefitting "Main Street" and not
"Wall Street." With the 2010 repeal causing the government to
forego billions, if not trillions, of dollars in revenue, it was not the
time to further reduce taxes for the wealthiest Americans. By in-
creasing the applicable exclusion amount of both the estate tax and
the gift tax to $5 million and reducing the rates even lower than
those stated in EGTRRA, lawmakers further reduced the tax bur-
den for the wealthiest Americans.
To combat this recent change and achieve greater economic
sustainability, the exemption amount should be reduced for both
the estate tax and gift tax to $2 million per taxable estate. This is
an appropriate amount given the economically depressed state of
the country. At the previous $1 million estate tax exemption
amount, there was no shortage of wealth created and saved.II 0 In
108. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of2010 Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302,124 Stat 3296, 330l.
109. See Sunshine, supra note 97 ("Two years after the recession officially
ended, many Americans continue to feel the downturn's pain. The unemploy-
ment rate remains stuck above nine percent, wages are stagnant and home prices
continue to decline-all of which have caused some to question whether The
Great Recession is the best term to describe what the country has been
through.").
110. Barry W. Johnson & Brian G. Raub, Personal Wealth, 2001, SOl
BULLETIN, Winter 2005-2006, at 120, 128, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
01pwart.pdf ("The number of millionaires in each wealth class increased signifi-
cantly between 1998 and 2001, a period generally marked by strong economic
expansion until the onset of a recession in March 2001, which was in turn wors-
ened by the economic impact ofthe September 11 terrorist attacks. The number
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fact, because of the economic state of the country and the fact that
the increase was scheduled to exist for only one year, there was
little economic justification for the increase to $3.5 million in
2009.
After a year of the wealthiest Americans passing billions of
dollars of wealth free of the estate tax, there was every reason to
decrease the exemption levels and try to fiscally recuperate from
the foregone revenue of the 2010 repeal. By compromising and
permitting even further tax breaks for the wealthy, however, the
lawmakers acted in direct contradiction to the original purpose of
the estate tax. Very simply, it was the wrong move, at the wrong
time for the country.
As it stands now, many estates are exempt from the estate
tax, contributing only further to the lackluster performance of the
tax. When the economic state of the country has recovered, only
then would it be appropriate to implement a moderate increase in
the applicable exclusion amount. Yet, even in the absence of a
pressing need for significant revenue, increases in the exclusion
amount should nevertheless reflect the goal of curtailing wealth
concentration. As such, any increase should not be substantial, and
a complete repeal would be inappropriate.
Because tax policy directly impacts the potential of the es-
tate tax to raise revenue, policies should be developed with sensi-
tivity concerning the nation's economic needs. While the afore-
mentioned factors certainly remain key components of any prudent
estate tax policy analysis, other factors also inhibit the potential of
the estate tax to generate substantial revenue. Two such factors are
the charitable bequest deduction and wealth concentration.
IV. CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS
A. History ofthe Charitable Contribution Deduction
Within a year of the adoption of the permanent estate tax,
the War Revenue Act implemented the charitable contribution de-
of millionaires with net worth between $1 million and $5 million grew by 15.4
percent between 1998 and 2001, while the number of millionaires in the higher
wealth classes increased more rapidly, 41.3 percent for those with net worth
between $5 million and $10 million, and 46.4 percent for those with net worth of
$10 million or more." (footnote omitted)).
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duction.'!! The legislative history indicates that members of Con-
gress believed wealthier individuals would contribute to societal
projects such as higher education and charities if provided the
proper incentive to do SO.112 By implementing the charitable con-
tribution deduction, Congress sought to encourage charitable giv-
ing through the tax code.!"
The method seemingly created a "win" for the government
no matter where the funds were directed. Either a tax would be
paid directly to the government, or contributions would be paid to
fund charitable organizations, subsidized by the government, to
provide public services. Ultimately, therefore, the government's
objective in providing citizens' services would be achieved either
directly through taxes paid or indirectly through charitable organi-
zations. .
While some may question the government's aims in this
regard, it is clear that the government has an interest in ensuring
sufficient social services are provided. Philanthropy, through or-
ganized charity, has been in existence since the beginning of estab-
lished churches.'!" While state governments initially had the re-
sponsibility to provide for the poor with the greatest need, charita-
ble organizations have historically made up a majority of our chari-
table base.!" In fact, the United States has the largest number of
111. Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 3-5; see War Revenue Act, ch. 63, §
1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917); David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable
Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 537 (2006) ("Congress first adopted a chari-
table deduction in 1917 as part of a biIl raising federal income tax rates to fi-
nance the costs of entering World War I. Concerned that these tax increases
would suppress philanthropic giving, Congress aIlowed deductions for donations
to public charities and private foundations ...." (footnotes omitted)).
112. Alice M. Thomas, Re-Envisioning the Charitable Deduction to Legis-
late Compassion and Civility: Reclaiming Our Collective and Individual Hu-
manity Through Sustained Volunteerism, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 269,319
(2010); see 55 CONGo REC. 6728 (1917).
113. See, e.g., Ellen P. April, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Con-
tribution Deduction, 42 B.c. L. REv. 843, 849 (2001) ("Legislative history indi-
cates that this provision was prompted by the concern that without a deduction,
wealthy taxpayers ... would no longer contribute to institutions of higher learn-
ing.").
114. Thomas, supra note 112, at 296.
115. Id. at 296-97 ("The large presence of organizations in American civil
society is a unique cultural phenomenon. No other nation in the world has the
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charitable nonprofit organizations in the world today.i'" Even so,
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the poverty rate
soared, and charitable organizations no longer had the resources to
be the primary caretaker of the poor.'!" Although the government
had its own limitations with providing resources, it assumed the
responsibility to find a way to provide resources that had typically
been provided by charitable organizations.
To help further these ends, Congress adopted a tax policy
accommodating of charitable organizations. In addition to provid-
ing a tax exempt status for charitable organizations, the govern-
ment subsidized charity by providing deductions for individuals
and corporations who financially contributed to charitable organi-
zations. 18 While the tax exemption rule was already in existence
when the first income tax provisions were instated.l''" the charita-
ble contribution deduction was introduced into the tax code in
1917, and contributions to charitable organizations have been fully
deductible since 1918.120 Through such subsidization, the financial
number and diversity of nonprofit organizations doing charity. In most of the
world, government and religious organizations dole out charity to meet unmet
public needs." (footnote omitted)).
116. Id.; see also Arthur C. Brooks, A Nation ofGivers, THE AMERICAN,
(March/April 2008), http://www.american.comJarchive/2008/march-april-
magazine-contents/a-nation-of-giversl?searchterm=A%20Nation%200fOlo
20Givers ("No developed country approaches American giving.").
117. Thomas, supra note 112, at 295 ("The increased flow of immigrants,
the rising complexities of living in an industrial society, and the Civil War and
financial crises of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ... fueled the
flames of poverty in America. ").
118. /d. at 318.
119. /d. at 316-17 ("The broader Act, the first income tax law in the na-
tion's modem history, imposed a tax on the income of individuals and corpora-
tions. To counter this tax, a section of the Act provided that 'nothing herein
contained shall apply to ... corporations, companies, or associations organized
and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes.' This
was the first formal rule of federal tax-exemption in the history of U.S. tax law."
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
120. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in an Ideal Estate
Tax, 60 TAX L. REv. 263, 263 (2007); see Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No.
254, §403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098. The 1917 tax provision provided for a
charitable tax deduction for donations made by individuals to specified organi-
zations of up to 10% of taxable income.
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responsibility of providing for the poor was shared between the
government and charitable organizations.
Initially, the charitable contribution deduction was enacted
to balance the increase made to the income tax rate on account of
the extra funding needed for World War 1. 12I Additionally, the
charitable contribution deduction served the purpose of providing a
direct incentive to individual members of society who had the
means to donate to charitable causes. 122 Moreover, in 1935, amidst
the economic crisis caused by the Great Depression, Congress
made provisions for corporations to receive the charitable contribu-
tion deduction, up to 5%, against taxable income. 123 This move by
Congress provided an incentive for corporations to contribute to
charitable organizations in order to provide to the needy.
By providing such an incentive, Congress used tax policy
to finance a specific objective while contemporaneously and indi-
rectly providing a service that the government could or would not
provide directly. Yet, despite the government's motives for
providing various tax incentives, there should be a corresponding
benefit for the cost incurred to the make these tax incentives justi-
fiable. Whether these tax incentives really influence an individu-
al's or corporation's motives to contribute to charitable causes will
determine whether the deduction is appropriate to facilitate the
government's goal.
B. History and Justifications ofthe Tax Favored Treatment
One of the main reasons posited in favor of giving tax-
favored treatment to charitable organizations is the public benefit
that our society receives as a result of the works of charitable or-
ganizations. Generally, the belief is that the government prefers to
grant favorable tax treatment to charitable organizations in order to
encourage them to do the work that the government cannot or will
121. Thomas, supra note 112, at 318-19; see also Revenue Act of 1932,
Pub. L. No. 154,47 Stat. 169.
122. Thomas, supra note 112, at 325 ("When Congress enacted the chari-
table deduction in 1917, the legislative history reflects that one of the authors of
the provision, Senator Henry Hollis, 'contended that the imposition of heavy
World War 1taxes would hurt charitable institutions by tempting wealthy men ..
. to economize .... They will say, [c]harity begins at home.'" (alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
123. ld. at 320.
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not perform on its own. The primary authority in support of this
public benefit position is evident from the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Bob Jones University v. United States. 124 The
Court stated:
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that
the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a bene-
fit which the society or the community may not it-
self choose or be able to provide, or which supple-
ments and advances the work of public institutions
already supported by tax revenues. History but-
tresses logic to make clear that, to warrant exemp-
tion under § 501(c)(3), an institution must fall with-
in a category specified in that section and must de-
monstrably serve and be in harmony with the public
interest.125
Ever since the charitable contribution deduction and chari-
table bequest deduction were implemented, the presumed goal of
the government has been to encourage charitable works and relieve
some of the pressure from the government to provide assistance to
the needy. Such a goal is a sound one, for the plight of the poor
has remained a consistent societal issue. Since 1959, the poverty
rate has been consistently above 10%,126 and between 2007 and
2009, the number of people in poverty increased by more than 6.3
million people. 127 Moreover, as recently as 2009, the official pov- .
erty rate was 14.3%, the highest rate since 1994.128 Given such
stark statistics, the question remains whether charitable organiza-
124. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
125. Id. at 591-92 (footnote omitted).
126. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:
200956 tbl. B-1 (2009), http://www.census.gov/prod/201Opubs/p60-238.pdf.In
2009, there were nearly 43.6 million people in poverty, the largest number of
people living in poverty in the fifty-one years that the poverty rate has been
recorded. See id. "If a family's total money income is less than the applicable
threshold, then that family and every individual in it are considered in poverty."
!d. at 55. "The official poverty definition uses money income before taxes and
tax credits and excludes capital gains and non-cash benefits ...." Id.
127. Id. at 14.
128. Id. at 56.
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tions have done enough to assist the government with providing
goods and services to the poor.
If the government's motivation to subsidize charitable or-
ganizations was based on the premise of sharing responsibility to
assist the poor, the foregone revenue should match the value of the
goods or services provided to the poor. Absent the provision of
public services commensurate to what the government could have
provided with a tax, the charitable deduction should be disallowed.
Under the estate tax, for example, the merits of the unlimited chari-
table bequest deduction are deserving of particular scrutiny. While
it is difficult to trace the benefit of the charitable bequest deduction
proper, one may begin to determine whether the current unlimited
deduction is a good investment by inquiring how charitable be-
quest dollars are allocated and how charitable organizations allo-
cate resources in general.
C. Motivations for Making Charitable Gifts
Although tax policy has been attributed significant credit
for charitable giving,129 a short perusal into factors that motivate
individuals to make charitable gifts is warranted to determine
whether a change in tax policy actually influences the behavior of
givers. While economists have attempted to conduct studies to
determine whether tax policy has had an effect on individual be-
havior to make charitable contributions.P" the individual reasons
for making contributions often vary and are difficult to determine.
Nevertheless, an inspection of who contributes and where they
contribute may provide some guidance.
129. CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, THE ESTATE TAX AND CHARITABLE GIVING 3
(2004) [hereinafter THE ESTATE TAX AND CHARITABLE GIVING],
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/56xx/doc5650/07-15-CharitableGiving.pdf ("Peo-
ple make charitable gifts for a variety of reasons. Over and above those reasons,
the tax code may influence the level of giving by affecting both its 'cost' (rela-
tive to that of other possible uses for the money) and the amount of resources
available to individuals to give.").
130. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim, Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue?
1 TAX POL'yECON. 113 (1987).
2012 Change We Can't Believe In ... or Afford 523
Historically, individuals make more charitable gifts in a
given year than any other source, 131 and nearly 90% of their chari-
table gifts are made during their lifetimes. 132 In deciding whether
these individuals had a tax motivated reason for giving, it is helpful
to categorize the donors to determine where the different types of
donors contributed. Such analysis is required because individual
tax returns are not available freely for public viewing.
In reviewing the potential reasons for giving, it is useful to
determine the income level of donors who were making charitable
contributions and where they made such contributions. One study
conducted at Indiana University has already done so, s~ecifically
categorizing its fmdings by household income levels.i ' For ex-
ample, of the households with income levels under $100,000, rep-
resentative of 90% of the U.S. population, 42% contribute to reli-
gious causes, accounting for almost 60% of overall contributions to
religious organizations. 134
In specifically analyzing the contributions to religious or-
ganizations, the same study provided information indicating how
funds were allocated. Of the estimated $101 billion contributed to
religious organizations, approximately 20% is estimated to have
been used to provide directly for the pOOr. 135 Of the remaining
131. See e.g., AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 200022
(Ann E. Kaplan ed., 2000), available at http://www.givinginstitute.org/ mem-
bers/pdfs/gusa2000.pdf.
132. THE ESTATE TAXAND CHARITABLE GIVING, supra note 129, at 1.
133. See CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., PATTERNS OF
HOUSEHOLD GIVING BYINCOME GROUP, 2005 (2007) [hereinafter PATTERNS OF
HOUSEHOLD GIVING], http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/research/giving%20
focused%200n%20meeting%20needs%200flIo20the%20poorOIo20july%20
2007.pdf. The study is restricted to the impact of private charities and private
foundations. The data sets used for the study were based on the data provided
by the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study ("COPPS") 2003 to estimate giving
for households with annual incomes below $200,000. !d. at 2. Households
earning an annual income below $100,000 have contributed almost $60 billion
to religious organizations while households earning between $100,000 and
$200,000 donated $11 billion. Id. at 5. Households earning between $200,000
and $1,000,000 donated $21 billion while households with income in excess of
$1,000,000 gave just under $9 billion. !d.
134. Id. 4-5.
135. Id. at 18. This percentage was based on the benevolent services re-
ported by religious organizations. Benevolent services include-but are not
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funds contributed, 76% is estimated to have funded congregational
operations.v" At fust glance, it would appear that the majority of
the contributions are used to operate basic facilities.
While the study's data made it impossible for the research-
ers to determine how much of the operational funds were used to
directly assist the poor,137 generalized conclusions may be drawn.
Although congregational operations may appear to provide indirect
support, and in some instances that will be true, when a church
operates or specifically directs its services to low-income commu-
nities to provide poverty-relief services, this may be counted as
havi id d di 138mg provi e irect support.
In a similar vein, the study's researchers looked further into
funds categorized as "benevolent expenditures.t'{" Because a be-
nevolent act is not necessarily designated for the poor, the re-
searchers found it prudent to determine how the benevolent ex-
penditures were made and who benefitted from them. To further
this analysis and specifically determine how much of the offerings
were used to assist the poor, the researchers consulted data gath-
ered by the National Council of Churches ("NCC") that provided
an allocation of how benevolent offerings were reported as used. 140
Based on the information provided by the NCC, as much as 84%
of the funds categorized as benevolent offerings were focused on
providing assistance to the pOOr. 14 1 As these findings show, con-
tributions to religious organizations have the greatest chance of
being used to provide assistance to the poor.
limited to--food banks, overseas ministries, special offerings, and gifts by
churches. !d. at 19.
136. ld. at 18.
137. ld. at 19.
138. ld.
139. ld.
140. Id. at 3. The report also consulted the 2006 edition of the Yearbook
of American and Canadian Churches-published by NCC-which provides
information regarding the total contributions and benevolent contributions to
Protestant denominations. ld. at 18. The NCC was established in 1950 and
includes member faith groups of Protestant, Anglican, Orthodox, Evangelical,
historic African American and Living Peace churches, and includes "45 million
persons in more than 100,000 local congregations in communities across the
nation." NCC at a Glance, NCCUSA.ORG, http://www.ncccusa.org/about/
about _ncc.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
141. PAITERNS OF HOUSEHOLD GIVING, supra note 133, at 19 tbl. 13.
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When evaluating the contributions made to charitable or-
ganizations designed to help meet basic needs, the study deemed
all contributions to have been used to help the pOOr. 142 As previ-
ously mentioned, the category of households with incomes less
than $100,000 contributed substantially more to religious organiza-
tions and charitable organizations designed to help meet basic
needs. As the research demonstrates, these two organizational
types are more likely to provide a greater percentage of contribu-
tions received to provide consistent assistance to the needy.
The category of households with annual income levels be-
low $100,000 also out-contributed the higher income levels when
measuring contributions to charitable organizations assisting with
meeting basic needs of the poor. 143 These households contributed
49% of all household giving to charitable organizations that are
perceived to be providing assistance to the poor. 144
When the type of service provided by the charity changes,
however, so too does the likely donor. For instance, when measur-
ing donations to education-related charities, the contribution
sources are almost completely opposite to that of the religious or-
ganizations. Just consider the contributions made by households
earning $200,000 or more: such households provided over $42
billion in charitable contributions, and nearly 82% of those house-
holds gave to education-related charitable organizations.Y Con-
versely, households earning less than $100,000 provided almost
$2.7 billion to education, an amount representing 6% of all giving
to education-related organizations. 146
This trend also holds true for health-related charitable or-
ganizations as well as combined purpose charities. 147 For example,
142. /d. at 22.
143. /d. at 22 tbl. 16. Households earning less than $100,000 contributed
over $9 billion while households earning between $100,000 and $200,000 con-
tributed almost $2.5 billion. Id. Households earning between $200,000 and
$1,000,000 contributed $5.3 billion while households earning more than
$1,000,000 contributed $1.9 billion. Id.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 9 tbl. 6.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 6, 8. Combined purpose charities are organizations that
receive contributions that are allocated to multiple types of charities. Id. at 6.
Examples of such organizations are the United Way, donor-advised funds at
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households with annual income levels of $200,000 or more con-
tributed almost $18 billion, an amount representing 81% of contri-
butions made to health-related charitable organizations.U" The
same households contributed $12.25 billion to combined purpose
organizations, an amount representing 55.4% of total giving to
combined purpose organizations.l'" On the other hand, households
earning less than $100,000 contributed about $3 billion to health-
related organizations, an amount representing almost 14% of all
contributions made to such organizations. 150 Similarly, these
households contributed $7.7 billion to combined purpose organiza-
tions, an amount representing approximately 35% of contributions
d h .. lSIrna e to sue orgamzations.
With respect to education-related and health-related organi-
zations, the resources used to assist the poor were dedicated on a
much smaller scale. For example, of the approximately $22 billion
contributed to health-related organizations, an estimated 10% was
used to help the pOOr. 152 Therefore, the vast majority of the contri-
butions to health organizations were not expended or redistributed
in direct service to the poor. For instance, more than half of the
allocations were designated to hospital operations and disease-
specific organizations.P'' Similar results are reflected in the dona-
tions to education-related organizations. Although such organiza-
tions received an estimated $45.92 billion according to the
financial institutions, and the National Philanthropic Trust. !d. These organiza-
tions collect funds for distribution to other charities. /d.
148. Id. at 8 tbl. 5.
149. /d. at 6 tbl. 3.
150. /d. at 8 tbl. 5.
151. Id. at 6 tbl. 3.
152. Id. at 22. This estimate is based on the funds expended for health
causes for the poor. See id. To determine whether the organization was deemed
to assist the poor, the researchers looked at the purpose for which the recipient
organization was founded. /d. at 23. With respect to charities that help termi-
nally ill children, assist with hospice care, and provide services for the elderly,
half of the amount contributed was deemed to assist the poor. /d. Health care
clinics were also deemed to serve the poor. /d.
153. Id. at 23 tbl. 18. Disease specific organizations, which include re-
search, treatment, and prevention facilities, received 25% of all giving, and hos-
pitals received 35.7%. /d. Hospital foundations received the next largest benefit
at 16.6%. /d.
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study,154 a mere 15.7% of that sum was deemed as dedicated to
assisting the poor. 155 With these factors considered, the extensive
subsidization levels provided by the government become more
suspect. While these organizations clearly provide a service for
the general population, it is difficult to determine what, if any, im-
pact they may have in providing for the poor.
For combined purpose organizations, the study found that
the largest percentage of funding was made to organizations assist-
ing at-risk youth and families in crisis,156 and the study determined
that 64.8% was focused on assisting the poor. 157 Of the remaining
funds, 24% could not be determined, and 11% was dedicated to
community-based needs. 158 For the undetermined 24%, the study
attributed half of the amount to assisting the poor. 159 Yet, even
with the most generous allocations, less than one-third of overall
charitable giving was estimated as providing focused need for the
poor. 160
Reviewing the data, a number of inferences can be made
about the motivations of the donors. For instance, donors with
household incomes ofless than $100,000 were more likely to give
to causes and organizations that were perceived to serve the needs
of the poor. In addition, one would tend to believe that these do-
nors were less likely to have a tax-motivated reason for giving.
Lower income contributors were not likely to have taxable estates,
and thus, if a tax-motivated reason for contributing did exist, then
it would have been income tax-related.
154. Id at 24.
155. Id. ("Donations estimated to be helping the poor were those made to
higher education endowments with the restricted purpose of student financial
aid, those made to private schools with the restricted purposed [sic] of student
financial aid, and a proportion (1/2) of those made to all other educational funds
(libraries, tutoring, literacy programs, etc).").
156. !d. at 20.
157. !d.
158. !d.
159. Id. at 21. Some of the organizations, though not dedicated to the
needs of the poor, are highly likely to serve the needs of the poor even though
they may also serve the other income levels. Id. (providing examples such as
health organizations, civil rights organizations, and education causes). As a
result, such organizations were designated as uncertain but estimated to provide
half the services to the poor. Id.
160. Id at 30 & fig. 3.
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On the other hand, donors with high household incomes
were more likely to contribute to organizations and causes with
which they had a relationship or a personal affinity. If the organi-
zation also benefitted the poor, that was seemingly a secondary
consideration. 161 By evaluating where these donors contributed, it
is clear that this inference is not an unfair one. For instance, of the
categories discussed thus far, health and education were the domi-
nant recipients of donors with household incomes of $200,000 or
above, and these organizations were amongst the lowest in provid-
.. h 162
mg assistance to t e poor.
Individuals who donate to educational organizations tend to
have a relationship, past or present, that motivates the contribution
to that particular organization. The same inference can be made
for contributions to health-related organizations. Recall the contri-
butions made to health-related organizations. Other than hospitals,
the major recipients of contributions were organizations connected
to disease-related health care. 163 Donors to these types of organi-
zations are less likely to be random donors.
Even so, tax motivations may well be a factor in making
charitable giftS.I64 For example, because the taxpayer receives a
greater tax benefit by contributing to public charities over private
foundations, charitable contribution deduction tax policy can be
highly influential as to where donors contribute.l'" Significantly,
161. See CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., SIGNIFICANT GIFTS:
WHERE DONORS DIRECT THEIR LARGEST GIFTS AND WHY 41 (2009),
http://www.campbellcompany.com/Portals/22807/docs/S ignficant. Gifts.Report_
FlNAL_09-22-09.pdf ("Higher income households had slightly different moti-
vations for their giving compared with the general population. The goal report-
ed by most higher income households was to make their community a better
place to live (39.5 percent), followed by a sense that it was the responsibility of
those with more to give to those with less (36.9 percent).").
162. PATTERNS OF HOUSEHOLD GIVING, supra note 133, at 8, 24.
163. /d. at 23.
164. THE ESTATE TAX AND CHARITABLE GIVING, supra note 129, at 3
("People make charitable gifts for a variety of reasons. Over and above those
reasons, the tax code may influence the level of giving by affecting both its
'cost' (relative to that of other possible uses for the money) and the amount of
resources available to individuals to give. Provisions in the individual income
tax and the estate tax affect both factors.").
165. Compare I.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010), with id. §
l70(b)( 1)(8) (2006).
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the same is not true for the charitable bequest deduction, as the
taxpayer receives the same tax benefit whether he contributes to a
public charity or a private foundation. 166
On the whole, it is largely difficult to determine what moti-
vates an individual donor to make contributions, for at its core, the
decision to donate is a highly personal one. Even when tax moti-
vations might be uncovered, it is clear that the tax benefit is only
available to those taxpayers who itemize deductions. 167 Neverthe-
less, while deciphering motivations is an arduous process, some
predictable, albeit inconclusive, trends for charitable giving may be
established. For example, lower income taxpayers are more prone
to contribute to charitable organizations focused on assisting the
poor. Because programs that assist the poor are likely the type of
charitable organizations the government anticipated subsidizing
when it provided tax breaks, the law should more strongly counte-
nance the type of charity that predominates among low income
households. The same cannot be said for the charity exhibited by
high income tax earners; in general, high income households do
not appear to favor charitable organizations that are focused on
providing for the poor. Rather, charitable giving among high earn-
ers appears to be primarily motivated by personal relationships and
a desire to benefit the community at large rather than to bestow a
direct benefit to the poor. This trend also holds true for charitable
bequest gifts, clearly demonstrating that the unlimited deduction
cannot be justified as a matter of public policy.
D~ Impact ofPhilanthropy on the Poor
To determine how much charitable capital has been ex-
pended in assisting the poor, the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana
University has conducted several studies to determine the impact
of formal philanthropy. 168 In addition, other scholars and studies
166. l.R.C. § 2055(a), (d) (2006).
167. Charitable contributions are below the line deductions and therefore
will not be eligible for deduction unless the taxpayer itemizes his deductions.
168. PATTERNS OF HOUSEHOLD GIVING, supra note 133. As previously
stated, these studies are restricted to the impact of private charities and private
foundations and use data sets based on the data provided by COPPS 2003 to
estimate giving for households with annual incomes below $200,000. Id. at 2.
COPPPS surveys are conducted every two years of approximately "8,000
households that make up a national representative sample of the U.S. popula-
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have weighed in to examine the impact charitable dollars have
made on the poor, as well as the general public. By integrating the
insights and comments from these studies, one may more easily
conclude what framework is needed for a modem estate tax.
In the early years of the estate tax, the unlimited charitable
bequest deduction may have been justified for purely motivational
purposes, despite the fact that no other satisfactory explanation
could be supplied for its unlimited nature.l'" By providing indi-
viduals the motivation to contribute to charitable organizations
which would then support social programs.l " Congress could also
help the government to subsidize services it did not want to or
could not provide. Even so, justification for an unlimited deduc-
tion does not ordinarily flow from this rationale because the chari-
table contribution deduction provides the same incentive and yet
has limitations.
In reviewing the data, a significant share of charitable be-
quest dollars are distributed to private foundations. 171 As such,
following the private foundation dollars may provide good insight
as to how charitable bequest dollars are expended. Despite the
need for a detailed analysis, there should be no dispute that founda-
tions play an important role in our society. Foundations have the
ability to impact the community in ways and in amounts that the
government has not and will not be able to match. l n
tion." Id. For households with annual incomes above $200,000, the Bank of
America Study of High Net-Worth Philanthropy Study ("BOA") was used. Id.
The BOA study also used a random sample of households using the same cate-
gories and definitions as COPPS. !d.
169. Fleischer, supra note 120, at 264.
170. Thomas, supra note 112, at 319.
171. Fleischer supra note 120, at 272; see also CTR.ON PHILANTHROPY AT
IND. UNIV., GIVING USA 2009: THE ANNUAL REpORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR
THE YEAR 200853 (2009) [hereinafter GIVING USA 2009] ("Since at least 2001,
according to estate tax returns, on average 45 percent of the amount contributed
by [charitable] bequests has gone to foundations. The balance is divided among
all other types of charities. If the percentage of bequest dollars going to founda-
tions holds for 2008, then approximately $12.5 billion in 2008 was bequeathed
to charities other than foundations.").
172. See Carl J. Schramm, Law Outside the Market: The Social Utility of
the Private Foundation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 355, 360 (2006) ("Private
foundations play this role in society. Creations of successful entrepreneurs who
seek the reconstitution of wealth, foundations are conceived as having the par-
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On the other hand, the government may be giving up much
needed revenue without receiving much benefit if foundations only
provide a minimum benefit to assist the government in aiding the
poor. For instance, in 1952, foundations received in excess of $3
billion from individuals and paid out only $300 million in grants
that year. 173 Moreover, in 1975, charitable bequest giving was es-
timated at $2.23 billion, with most of the bequests being granted to
education, health, and cultural causes. 174
By 2004, total charitable gifts were estimated at $249 bil-
lion, of which almost $20 billion was made in charitable be-
quests.175 Most of the bequests were granted to private founda-
tions, education, health, and cultural causes.!" While these causes
certainly contribute to society at large, they do not necessarily pro-
vide a specific benefit to the poor.
By 2008, total charitable gifts were estimated at $308 bil-
lion dollars. l 77 Of the charitable gifts for the year, charitable be-
quest giving was estimated at $22.66 billion.178 Almost half of the
bequests were devised to private foundations-recipients that are
not inherently dedicated to assisting the poor.179 Because the pre-
sumed original intent for the unlimited deduction is not fulfilled
through such giving, reform to the deduction is needed. Very
ticularistic entrepreneurial role of challenging other institutions to continuous
renewal. In this way, foundations break the static equilibrium toward which
social institutions gravitate and allow the economy's welfare-generating capabil- -
ities to continue to expand efficiently and effectively.").
173. AM. ASS'N OF FUND-RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING USA: FACTS ABOUT
PHILANTHROPY 6 (1956) [hereinafter FACTS ABOUT PHILANTHROPY].
174. AM. ASS'N OFFUND-RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING USA: 1976 ANNUAL
REpORT 11 (Fred Schnaue ed., 1976).
175. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA 2005: THE
ANNUAL REpORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2004 16 (2005) [hereinafter
GIVING USA 2005].
176. ld. at 70 & tbl. I. Most charitable bequests gifts were given to large
organizations. Health organizations received an average of 186 gifts averaging
$82,705 each, education organizations received an average of 55 gifts averaging
$131,009 each, and international organizations received an average of 76 be-
quests averaging $123,454 each. Id.
177. See GIVING USA 2009, supra note 171, at 53.
178. Id.
179. See id.
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simply, the range of the deduction should be dependent on its abil-
ity to redirect resources to the poor.
E. Charitable Bequest Deduction
1. History and Overview
While the Revenue Act of 1916 enacted what became the
permanent estate tax, it notably did not make a provision for chari-
table bequest deductions. In fact, it was not until the Revenue Act
of 1918 that the charitable bequest deduction was enacted. 180 Alt-
hough the charitable contribution deduction was enacted to offset
increased income tax liability, there has been little discussion re-
garding the reason the charitable bequest deduction was enacted
and why the deduction is unlimited.
If one may assume justifications for the charitable bequest
deduction mirror those for the charitable contribution deduction,
then the charitable bequest deduction was intended as an additional
incentive for the wealthy to make contributions to charitable or-
ganizations which could provide some relief to the government in
assisting the poor. Yet, charitable bequests also produce an ancil-
lary benefit to their bolstering of charitable organizations; by mak-
ing charitable bequests for the tax benefit, the wealthy voluntarily
divert some of their riches to the public, thereby facilitating some
redistribution of wealth. Because the charitable contribution de-
duction and the charitable bequest deduction advance similar so-
cietal objectives, however, it is questionable why the charitable
bequest deduction is unlimited when the charitable contribution
deduction is not.
2. Private Foundations and Their Resources
In addition to analyzing the gifts received by private foun-
dations and comparing how resources were expended in a giving
year, it is also helpful to compare the charitable bequest funds re-
ceived by private foundations to the federal receipts collected by
the estate tax in a given year. By making such a comparison, the
180. Kristine S. Knaplund, Charity for the Death Tax: The Impact ofLeg-
islation on Charitable Bequests, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 713, 736 (2010).
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numbers may shed some light on how much revenue may be avail-
able for redirection.
In 1937, private foundations reported capital assets to the
tune of over $945 million. 18 1 On the other hand, the government
reported $306 million in transfer tax receipts.l'" By 1954, capital
assets for private foundations were reported at $5.4 billion, I83
whereas the transfer taxes reported a mere $934 million in federal
receipts. 184
In recent years, these comparisons have reflected much
closer amounts. In the year 2004, private foundations received
approximately $20 billion in gifts and made $29 billion in
grants. 18S The transfer taxes generated approximately $25 bi1-
lion.186 In the year 2008, private foundations received almost $33
billion in charitable gifts and made $41.21 billion in grants, while
the transfer taxes generated $29 billion. 187
These numbers indicate how private foundation wealth has
developed over the years and how substantial the contributions to
foundations were during the selected years. Although it is clear
that charitable bequest dollars make up a small amount of founda-
tion wealth.i'" one would surmise that private foundations would
181. GENEVA SEYBOLD, AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR FIELDS IV
12 (4th ed. 1939).
182. Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 6-5 tbl. 6.1.
183. FACTS ABOUT PHILANTHROPY, supra note 173, at 6.
184. Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 6-5 tbI. 6.1.
185. GIVING USA 2005, supra note 175, at 16. Foundations are not the'
only recipients of charitable bequests but charitable bequests contribute most of
their resources to funding foundations. See GIVING USA 2009, supra note 171,
at 53. Measuring how foundations support societal goals is a good way of de-
termining the public benefit of the charitable bequest deduction because public
charities receive their significant gift from individuals during their lifetimes.
See THEESTATE TAX AND CHARITABLE GIVING, supra note 129, at 1. In some
cases a significant gift may be announced but the distribution schedule for pay-
ments may be over a period of years. It is important to note that charitable be-
quest giving in a given year may not necessarily correlate with the distribution
schedule of estates so the reporting date may not necessarily be in the year the
gift was given.
186. Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 6-5 tbl. 6.1.
187. GIVING USA 2009, supra note 171, at 1,59; Joulfaian, supra note 35,
at 6-5 tbl. 6.1.
188. GIVING USA 2009, supra note 171, at 18 (noting that bequest contri-
butions were 9.8% of total contributions from 1969 to 1973).
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have a substantial impact on the community given the substantial
amount of gifts that are made to them.
Although private foundation grants may certainly have a
substantial impact on the community at large, the majority of that
impact is concentrated on select demographics that do not concen-
trate on assisting the pOOr. 189 Even more, in comparison to chari-
table bequest funding, the estate tax has not developed nearly as
well in generating revenue. Thus, redirecting funds from a chari-
table bequest to the government may have a minor effect on chari-
table organizations given that the vast majority of charitable gifts
are made during the taxpayer's lifetime.
On the other hand, diverted revenue may still have a signif-
icant impact on the government receipts when coupled with an
increase in estate tax liability. As a result, it would appear that
those estates large enough to pay taxes take advantage of the chari-
table bequest deduction to pay fewer taxes to the government and
more money towards the charitable organization of their choosing.
Because the diversion of funds has not necessarily been reducing
the government's burden to provide for the poor, however, it
would be inefficient to continue to permit the substantial govern-
ment subsidization of these charities in this manner.
3. Challenges to the Unlimited Deduction
Assuming the "incentivized giving" motive, the unlimited
nature of the charitable bequest deduction would be justified if
donors made substantial contributions and those recipient charita-
ble organizations provided a benefit to the public that is both nec-
essary and more efficient than if the government used the tax dol-
lars to provide the same. In addition, if a correlating restraint on
wealth concentration existed, then the charitable bequest deduction
would serve a purpose that the charitable contribution deduction
would not match.
Therefore, in order to justify the expense of the charitable
bequest deduction, the government should yield the same or simi-
lar rate of return on the investment. In other words, the revenue
189. Jd at 67, fig. 1. Private foundations make large numbers of grants in
the fields of education, health and arts, which provide a general benefit to the
public at large.
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lost should match the value of the goods and services provided by
the organization. Of course, the goods and services provided
should be necessary to the public if the government is to use its
own policies to foster them.190 The government should not forego
revenue from otherwise taxable assets unless it is in the public's
interest to do so.
Fortunately, scholars have already begun to scrutinize the
policy inherent in the current charitable bequest deduction. For
example, Professor Miranda Fleischer has questioned the justifica-
tions behind the deduction and its unlimited nature under the estate
taxation scheme.l'" In addition to analyzing the normative justifi-
cations for the estate tax charitable deduction and its structure, 192
Professor Fleischer raises a question as to whether a charitable de-
duction should be included or excluded in an "ideal" estate tax
base, and if included, "whether the deduction should be limited.,,193
Under her analysis, Professor Fleischer argues that private
foundations are the real "winners" of the charitable bequest deduc-
tion because they receive the lion's share of the bequests.l'" For
tax purposes, a private foundation is any entity that files for tax
exempt status that is not specifically excluded from being a private
foundation.l'" Generally, those organizations that qualify as public
charities are specifically excluded, such that private foundations
tend to be organizations with a single major source of funding
190. See Cynthia Belmonte, Domestic Private Foundations and Charitable
Trusts: Tax Years 2005 and 2006, SOl BULLETIN, Fall 2009, at 262, 262,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09fallbulfoundtrusts.pdf ("Private foundations
distribute billions of dollars to the charitable sector each year. Generally, these
distributions are grants to other tax-exempt organizations to assist in funding
their charitable programs.").
191. Fleischer, supra note 120, at 268 (arguing the case for the unlimited
deduction is "weak").
192. [d. at 267-68.
193. [d. at 268.
194. [d. at 271-72. In 2004, private foundations received 43% of the char-
itable bequests made. [d. at 272.
195. See Internal Revenue Serv., Exemption Requirements-Section
501(c)(3) Organizations, http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/O..id=
96099,00.htrnl (last updated Jan. 30,2012).
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which engage in making grants as opposed to providing goods or
direct services. 196
While a societal benefit generally accompanies most chari-
table acts, private foundations raise the question of whether the
government should subsidize work that has a limited pool as bene-
ficiaries. After all, why should the government subsidize some-
thing that does not greatly impact the public positively? Under a
proposal by Professor Fleischer, the deductibility of a bequest
should be based on whether the recipient charitable organization
targets the wealthy or poor and disadvantaged. 197
Such limited deductibility is based on the concept that the
estate tax should enhance equality of opportunity. 198 If the recipi-
ent organization's target clients are the poor and disadvantaged,
then the deduction would be fully deductible.l'" If the recipient
organization targets both wealthy and poor clients, then the deduc-
tion would be around 50%.200
If the recipient organization is a private foundation, then
the deduction would be based on where the grants are awarded. 201
If the grants are solely awarded to organizations that target the
poor and disadvantaged, then the deduction would be fully deduct-
196. Cynthia Belmonte & Melissa Ludlum, Domestic Private Foundations
Tax Years 2003-2007, SOl BULLETIN, Winter 2011, at 173, 173,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/llpfdomwinbull.pdf ("Several characteristics
distinguish a private foundation from other types of tax-exempt organizations,
including its narrow sphere of support and control. A private foundation may be
organized as a corporation, association, or trust. Typically, a private foundation
is funded by a small number of private donors. Additionally, control of the pri-
vate foundation is generally limited to an individual, family, or corporation....
A nonoperating foundation supports charitable programs indirectly, providing
grants to other charitable organizations, rather than operating programs of its
own.").
197. Fleischer, supra note 120, at 297.
198. See id. at 292.
199. Jd. at 297.
200. 1d. at 307. Professor Fleischer provides an in-depth justification for
the proposed limitation of around 50%. Ideally, the deduction would be based
on the percentage the organization used to target assistance to the non-wealthy.
See id. By acknowledging the difficulty in making the determination of how
much assistance is targeted for the non-wealthy, she ultimately proposes 50% as
a compromise because some assistance benefits the non-wealthy and should
therefore qualify for deduction. See id. at 307-09.
201. Jd. at 310.
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ible?02 If the grants are awarded to a mixed-clientele-type organi-
zation, then the corresponding deduction would likely be 50%.203
Very simply, the system should function to ensure that organiza-
tions that are subsidized create new opportunities for the poor and
disadvantaged.i'" The only difficulty of implementing such a law
would be in deciding which organizations qualify for the full de-
duction and which organizations would not qualify.
When determining how to categorize which charities quali-
fy for the full deduction, a determination would have to be made of
each organization based on the services provided. In addition,
once categorized, these organizations would be limited to provid-
ing the same or similar services; otherwise, they would risk being
placed in another category which may no longer permit the full
deduction.
In theory, a charity could qualify in one year for the full
deduction and be disqualified in the next year. Conceptually, the
notion that an organization may lose its status because of its behav-
ior is not troubling; what is troubling is the lack of predictability
that may result depending on who defines the criteria. Depending
on the governing body, it may be difficult to determine which ser-
vices qualify for the full deduction and which services qualify for a
lesser one. Once qualified, moreover, there would have to be some
kind of recertification process to verify the level of deduction
available for the contribution. Clearly, these factors make the situ-
ation ripe for an administrative nightmare, and in the end, the ben-
efits of change may only be negligible if organizations narrowly
tailor their behavior only so far as is required to qualify for deduc-
tion status. Even with reform, the government could still be with-
out the additional revenue and may only receive a small percentage
of additional assistance with assisting the poor.
Notwithstanding the difficulties that accompany such tax
reform, other scholars have made the same inquiries advanced by
Professor Fleischer. For example, Professor Mark Ascher has also
questioned the unlimited nature of the charitable bequest deduc-
tion. 205 The purposes of his proposal are twofold: create opportu-
202. Id.
203. Id
204. See id. at 298.
205. See Ascher, supra note 60, at 136.
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nities for the non-wealthy and raise revenue for the government.
As a result, Professor Ascher has proposed to make the charitable
bequest deduction limited to 20% of the taxable estate, after ex-
penses.i'"
Although Professors Fleischer and Ascher make excellent
points regarding the need for an evaluation of the unlimited nature
of the charitable bequest deduction.i'" both proposals have limita-
tions. For instance, Professor Fleischer focuses on creating oppor-
tunities for the non-wealthy and does not make much provision for
raising revenue. Therefore, her proposal redirects the unlimited
deduction, creates more administrative burden for the government,
and captures no additional revenue to justify the modification.
Moreover, while Professor Ascher's proposal incorporates the
limitation on the deduction as a backstop to create some additional
revenue for the government, his approach treats all charities in the
same manner by imposing a 20% deduction limitation for all chari-
ties. Both scholars may have persuasive arguments, but there is
still a better way to further societal goals and raise revenue without
sacrificing harmony in the taxing system.
4. The Current Proposal
This Article's proposal for reforming the system incorpo-
rates a combination of the proposals advanced by Professor
Fleischer and Professor Ascher. While I believe that the charitable
bequest deduction should be limited to charities that provide ser-
vices that target the poor and disadvantaged.i'" certain limitations
on the deduction remain sensible.209 Specifically, my current pro-
posal modifies the charitable bequest deduction to mirror the in-
come tax charitable contribution deduction. First, the charitable
bequest deduction should be limited to 50% of the adjusted gross
estate when contributing to public charities. Moreover, when mak-
206. Id. Professor Ascher has a number of proposals focused on wealth
concentration that will be discussed later in this Article. Consistent with the
revenue-raising objective of his proposal, he would limit the charitable bequest
deduction to 20%. Therefore, this section of his article serves a minor purpose.
207. See generally Ascher, supra note 60; Fleischer, supra note 120.
208. See Fleischer, supra note 120, at 297.
209. See Ascher, supra note 60, at 136.
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ing contributions to private organizations, the deduction should be
limited to 20% of the adjusted gross estate.
Using the charitable contribution deduction, the govern-
ment created an incentive for charitable giving using a percentage-
based model and made it clear that it was effectively partnering
with these organizations. By foregoing the additional income tax,
the government was counting on charitable organizations to pro-
vide public goods and services to the needy. If societal goals are to
be furthered, a similar focus should accompany any analysis of the
charitable bequest deduction.
My current proposal would be efficient to administer be-
cause the criteria concerning which organizations qualify for vary-
ing levels of deductions have already been established. Public
charities would receive a 50% deduction while private organiza-
tions would receive a 20% deduction of the contribution base.210
As such, administrative burdens that accompany other proposals
would be taken out of the equation. There is no need to waste ad-
ministrative resources and manpower determining the deductibility
of mixed purpose charities and organizations under the donor ad-
vised funds umbrella.i!' and there is little utility in deliberating
whether charities which support the arts qualify for a deduction.
Such efforts require the kind of micro-management the govern-
ment, from a practical standpoint, does not have the resources or
desire in which to engage.
210. Understanding that I.R.C. § l70(b)(1)(B) (2006) provides for a 30%
deduction, this Article's suggestion offers less of a deduction because the tax-
payer has had the benefit of the lifetime use of his or her funds.
211. See e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF COLL. AND UNIV. Bus. OFFICERS,
SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO TAX RULES GOVERNING DONOR ADVISED FUNDS
AND SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDED IN H.R. 4, THE PENSION
PROTECTION ACT OF 2006 (2006), http://www.nacubo.org/documents/
DAFsandSupportingOrgsProvsofHR4.pdf (detailing the intricacies of determin-
ing the deductibility of certain charitable contributions). A charity is a mixed
purpose investment where it cannot be purely a financial investment. A mixed
purpose charity involves applying the financial investment rules to parts of an
investment. Also, a donor-advised fund allows people to give money, stock, and
other assets to special accounts. Donors may claim a deduction at the time of
the gift, and the institution administering the fund gains full control over the
contribution. Some organizations use these to ease administration oflarge dona-
tions.
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In many respects, the arts, as a category, is an easy target to
use as an example. While the opportunities to enjoy museums and
art festivals may be open to the public, the most likely patrons will
be those in the higher economic classes. Yet, although the arts
may do little to create opportunities for the disadvantaged, they
provide a valuable service to the community. As such, it is benefi-
cial to permit their continued subsidization by the government.
Deductibility is well-established under the income tax charitable
contribution provision, and a similar treatment should be afforded
under the estate tax. Under my proposal, an organization will ei-
ther qualify for public charity status or private foundation status,
and the deductibility of the bequest will be determined according-
ly.
Of course, while the arts, hospitals, and private education
facilities offer valuable benefits to the community, the government
should not heavily subsidize those public benefits when there is
little government benefit received. In other words, because the
government's burden to assist the poor has not been adequately
relieved by the diverted revenue, the charitable bequest deduction
should be limited and the additional tax dollars re-diverted to the
government.
By allocating a different percentage based on the type of
charitable organization recipient, the government will make a dis-
tinction between the kinds of goods and services provided by pub-
lic charities versus those provided by private foundations. With
the charitable contribution deduction, the government recognized
that both organizations offer something of value to the public, and
yet public charities were still given preferential tax treatment,
providing an additional incentive for the wealthy to support public
charitable organizations. That same preferential treatment was not
afforded to public charities when the charitable bequest deduction
was enacted.
With the current proposal, however, preferential treatment
will be afforded to public charities. Although it is difficult to de-
termine whether any tax policy actually affects an individual's
choice to give, it is likely that a person inclined to make contribu-
tions will take the additional tax benefit under consideration. Of
course, a natural concern regarding any modifications to the unlim-
ited nature of the charitable bequest deduction is whether there will
be a corresponding harm to charitable organizations.
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F. The Impact ofthe Charitable Bequest Deduction on the
Estate Tax
As previously discussed, tax policy changes stemming from
TRA 1976 negatively impacted the estate tax's ability to raise rev-
enue.
212 After the passage ofTRA 1976, both the revenue fienerat-
ed and the number of transfer tax returns filed decreased.' 3 Nev-
ertheless, although transfer tax revenues were decreasing, the same
was not true for charitable bequest giving.
In 1977, charitable bequest giving was estimated at $2 bi1-
lion,214 whereas the transfer tax generated $7 billion.215 Even
though the transfer tax receipts were substantial, a significant
amount of revenue was still foregone. When the transfer tax reve-
nue decreased to an estimated $5 billion in 1978, charitable be-
quest giving reported an increase to an estimated $2.6 billion.i'"
By 2000, the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") esti-
mated that $196 billion was contributed to charities and of that
number, about $16 billion was made as charitable bequests.t"
During the same year, the transfer tax generated an estimated $29
billion.218 Moreover, in 2003, a reported $241 billion was contrib-
uted to charities, and charitable bequests were an estimated $21.6
billion of those contributions.i'" During the same year, the transfer
tax generated an estimated $22 billion.22o By comparing the statis-
tical figures, one can see that the charitable bequest contribution
increased at a rate that clearly outpaced the transfer tax.
In 2008, overall charitable giving was estimated at $308
billion, and charitable bequest giving was estimated at $23 bil-
212. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
214. AM. ASS'NOFFUND-RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING USA: 1978 ANNUAL
REpORT 6 (Fred Schnaue ed., 1978).
215. Joulfaian supra note 35, at 6-5 tbl. 6.1.
216. AM. ASS'NOFFUND-RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING USA: 1979 ANNUAL
REpORT 6 (Fred Schnaue ed., 1979); Joulfaian supra note 35, at 6-5 tbl. 6.1.
217. THEESTATE TAX AND CHARITABLE GIVING 3, supra note 129, at 1-2.
218. Joulfaian supra note 35, at 6-5 tbl. 6.1.
219. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA 2004: THE
ANNUAL REpORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2003 6 (Melissa Brown ed.,
2004).
220. Joulfaian supra note 35, at 6-5 tbl. 6.1.
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lion.221 The transfer tax generated $29 billion.222 Even though
there was an increase in tax by 2008, when viewed as a whole,
there was as much tax revenue as charitable bequests. As the data
demonstrates, a substantial amount of revenue has been diverted to
charitable organizations through the charitable bequest deduction
over the years.
The government should reduce the unlimited deduction to a
50% limitation for public charities and a 20% limitation for private
foundations. If tax policy does influence behavior, as many have
proposed, then the new percentage limitations would encourage
more contributions to public charities because of the tax savings.
This would be desirable because public charities better represent
the organizations the government probably intended to subsidize
given that they benefit a wider range of the poor population. Even
if this is not the case, however, the government would collect more
revenue through the estate tax to reduce some of the government
debt and provide for the needy through existing programs.
By modifying the charitable bequest deduction, the gov-
ernment would gain an additional revenue stream without techni-
cally raising taxes.223 Even if the proposed percentage limitation
were to negatively affect charitable bequest giving, the current
structure does not incentivize contributing to those organizations
that primarily assist the poor. As such, it should not receive such
substantial favorable tax treatment.
When the economic needs of the country are great, this Ar-
ticle proposes eliminating the charitable bequest deduction alto-
gether. In the absence of a charitable bequest deduction, a donor
may be more motivated to make substantial lifetime gifts to chari-
ties. By making a lifetime charitable gift, he or she would be able
to take advantage of the charitable contribution deduction, thereby
221. GIVING USA 2009, supra note 171, at 1. The report indicates that
charitable giving decreased across-the-board and 2008 was the first time chari-
table giving had decreased since 1987. Id. at 3. The report further speculates
that perhaps EGTTRA was a factor with the reductions in estate taxes since
2001. !d. at 53.
222. Joulfaian supra note 35, at 6-5 tbl. 6.1.
223. This author recognizes that some may deem these modifications as
raising taxes because of the taxes the government would collect as a result of
these changes that is currently not collected.
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reducing the income tax obligation, diminishing the estate tax base,
and avoiding the gift tax altogether.
Inevitably, a potential challenge to my proposal is that
charities would be harmed by modifying the current unlimited de-
duction. A similar argument was raised in the CBO report which
addressed the concern of raising the estate tax exemption leve1.224
The authors of the report indicated that when a taxpayer's estate
tax liability is reduced to zero, his or her incentive to contribute to
charity is diminished.225 A similar argument can be made that a
reduction of the charitable bequest deduction will leave donors
with no incentive to make the charitable gift.226 As a result, chari-
table bequest gifts may fall. While these concerns are valid, the
total societal well-being outweighs any potential harm to the chari-
table sector. Professor Ascher addressed this concern by indicating
that whatever the amount received by the charitable organization
from a bequest, it would still net an increase of funding to the char-
ity?27 Thus, there is no reason to be distressed. Another potential
challenge to this Article's proposal is the uncertainty caused by the
unpredictable availability of the deduction. While this Article rec-
ognizes this to be a legitimate concern, estate planning has sur-
vived many years of uncertainty in other areas.
Moreover, because the charitable bequest deduction is a
privilege, the proposed modifications only dictate where the funds
will be directed. While there will be a greater tax liability for do-
nors if the deduction is limited, that reality alone is not enough of a
reason for the nation to forego additional revenue when extra fund-
ing is needed. For the potential charitable organizations, the funds
should not be relied upon until received because there is always a
chance the donor could change his or her mind or spend the funds
elsewhere.
In the end, society will be better served by the proposed
modifications because the proposed deduction system would en-
courage that more charitable giving be diverted to public charities.
224. THE ESTATE TAX AND CHARITABLE Grvmo 3, supra note 129, at 4-8.
225. ld. at 6-7.
226. Id. at 3 ("A charitable bequest of a dollar from an estate facing a 45
percent estate tax yields a 45-cent reduction in the estate's tax bill and thus cuts
bequests to other beneficiaries by only 55 cents. The reduction effectively low-
ers the cost of the charitable bequest in terms of what heirs receive.").
227. Ascher, supra note 60, at 136.
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In addition, it would generate additional revenue for the govern-
ment. Ultimately, the proposal will lead to the provision of greater
assistance to the poor by public charities, thereby relieving gov-
ernment resources and benefitting society as a whole.
V. WEALTH CONCENTRATION
A. BriefHistory
While the estate tax had its start as a temporary revenue
source, a social justice movement by progressives to combat
wealth concentration gained momentum shortly after the end of
World War 1. 228 These progressives sought to have government
leaders consider the inequities of the social and political power
held by the wealthy. At the time, there was particular concern
about the growing financial disparity between the rich and the
poor. For instance, in the 1920s, over a seven year period, Ameri-
cans earning annual incomes over $1 million increased from 21 to
511.229
Taking into consideration more than just the revenue aspect
of estate taxation, the progressives primarily wanted our leaders to
reduce wealth concentration.r'" There was a pervasive belief that
the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a concentrated segment
of society was inefficient, perhaps a threat to our democracy, and
as this view became paramount, the support for a permanent estate
tax was successful. Specifically, the progressives desired to con-
trol the undesirable societal effects believed to be associated with
concentration of wealth in private non-governmental organiza-
tions.231 The estate tax has long been believed to be the most ef-
228. Frederick, supra note 10, at 204 (''Though Progressives frequently
differed over how to achieve a greater equality of wealth distribution, their goal
was unmistakable and became a powerful political force in the years between
1890 and 1929.").
229. Cooper, supra note 7, at 885.
230. Frederick, supra note 10, at 203-04 ("Leveling the distribution of
wealth, whether through taxation or other mechanisms such as the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890, was one of the primary ideals that defined the Progressive
Era in the United States. Progressive theorists like Henry George argued that
there was no reason that industrialist tycoons should be allowed to so completely
enjoy the fruits of others' labor just because they owned the property that was
being labored upon." (footnote omitted)).
231. Jacobson et aI., supra note 54, at 120.
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fective way of reducing concentration of wealth. Over the years,
however, the estate tax has been ineffective in curtailing such
wealth as a result of the same tax policies that have made the estate
tax less effective as a revenue source.232 Thus, in addition to rais-
ing revenue, this Article's proposals may have an impact in curtail-
ing wealth concentration.
B. The Impact ofWealth Concentration and the Estate Tax
While it may not be difficult to conduct and track data re-
garding wealth concentration, it is difficult to determine what im-
pact any particular variable may have on it.233 Nevertheless, there
are empirical studies that track certain aspects of wealth concentra-
tion, and by inference we may draw certain conclusions from the
data?34 Interestingly, there are arguments both in support of and
against decreasing wealth concentration.
One theory advanced for the cause of wealth concentration
is linked to the concept of redistribution of wealth. For instance,
some scholars and researchers argue that poor growth rates are
attributed to the progressive nature of the income tax.235 As higher
income earners are burdened with more taxes, they are discouraged
from making capital investments, thereby stunting economic
growth.i'" In other words, the rich are fearful of investing and in-
creasing their own wealth because as they earn more, they are
fraught with more taxes, which in tum subsidizes the less fortu-
nate. As a result, the wealthy hold on to their money. This posi-
232. Caron, supra note 95, at 648 ("Similarly, today the tax system is less
progressive, and there is a greater concentration of wealth, than in 2001.").
233. James R. Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, 86 TAX
NOTES 1493, 1498 (2000), available at http://papers.ssm.comlsoI3/papers
.cfm?abstract id=982951.
234. See id. at 1494-1500.
235. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76
N.Y.V. L. REv. 825, 825-26 ("The share of the country's net worth held by the
top one percent of the wealthiest households declined from more than 44.2% in
1929 to 20.5% in 1979."); see also Repetti, supra note 233, at 1498 ("Since the
wealth transfer taxes are assessed on transfers of wealth, not income, the rele-
vant issue is whether the estate tax has affected wealth concentration, not in-
come concentration.").
236. Repetti, supra note 235, at 837 (noting the common theory that higher
taxes discourage capital investment and economic growth).
546 The University ofMemphis Law Review Vol. 42
tion, however, does not have the empirical support to back it Up.237
In fact, because substantial wealth is held by an elite minority, it is
difficult to add to the wealth pool. 238 The elite minority has a vest-
ed interest in keeping the economic picture in its current state. 239
Some claim that the disparity in wealth suggests a failure to
invest in education for the poor,240 for the majority of the people
working hard to attain that "American dream" will never reach
their goal. Part of the reason for such disparate results is due to the
lack of educational opportunities for those in the lower economic
237. Id. ("[S]tudies that directly have included tax rates in their regression
models have found that high tax rates do not playa negative role in growth.").
238. Lisa A. Keister et aI., Conference Transcript, Rising Wealth Inequali-
ty: Why We Should Care, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 437, 460 (2008)
("1 percent of the U.S. population currently own approximately half ofthe entire
financial wealth in this country. Financial wealth includes your assets minus
your debts but does not include your home equity. So 1 percent of the U.S.
population currently holds half of the entire financial wealth (stocks, bonds,
savings, and so on). The bottom 60 percent of Americans hold less than 1 per-
cent of the country's financial wealth, while the bottom 40 percent are actually
in debt. As a result of these and many other patterns, the United States currently
leads the developed world in terms of the extent and degree of its economic
inequality. With respect to poverty, the story is much the same. Whether we
look at overall levels of poverty, children's poverty, or poverty among the elder-
ly, the pattern is similar. That is, of all the advanced industrialized nations in the
world today, the United States ranks at the top in terms of poverty." (footnotes
omitted».
239. See DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT
CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH-AND
CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE 19 (2003) ("For a nation that has debated for years
whether the tax rate cuts begun by President Reagan in 1981 are 'trickle-down
economics,' it may be startling to read that the reality of these changes has been
just the reverse. The tax system is causing the benefit of American society to
flow up and pool at the top.").
240. JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EpIC OF AMERICA 415 (Taylor & Fran-
cis 1938) (1931) ("[The American Dream is] that dream of a land in which life
should be better and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each
according to his ability or achievement. It is a difficult dream for the European
upper classes to interpret adequately, and too many of us ourselves have grown
weary and mistrustful of it. It is not a dream of motor cars and high wages
merely, but a dream of a social order in which each man and each woman shall
be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they are innately capable, and be
recognized by others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstanc-
es of birth or position.").
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demographic.f'" Without the availability of or access to higher
education, people who live in poverty have little to no hope of
gaining enough ground to reach higher income levels. 242 Thus, the
impact of wealth concentration is far-reaching.
When the playing field is so dramatically skewed to one
side, it is of little surprise that the average person will never actual-
ly move beyond his or her current economic state. Moreover, it is
especially difficult to advance to the top echelon of societal wealth.
Even if we attribute some credit to a lack of investment in educa-
tion, it is difficult to determine the impact on economic growth
because there are scant few empirical studies that make the con-
nection.
Whatever the reason for the disparity in wealth, the estate
tax has long been charged to lead the battle against wealth concen-
tration. 243 In reviewing some of the data that tracks wealth concen-
tration, the studies show that, from 1929 until 1979, there was
some decrease in wealth concentration.i'" Specifically, there is
some evidence that demonstrates a reduction in the amount of
wealth transferred from within a family and that the combination
of the estate tax liability and charitable contribution deduction may
have been a factor in that reduction.r"
241. See generally Phyllis C. Smith, The Elusive Cap and Gown: The
Impact of Tax Policy on Access to Higher Education for Low-Income Individu-
als and Families, 10 BERKELEY 1. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'y 181 (2008). Many
people buy in to the ideology of the"American dream" no matter how elusive
the dream remains for most members of the population.
242. Id. at 181. The failure to invest in education and tax policy both in-
hibit access to higher education. For instance, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
was adopted to make higher education available to any family that wanted to
send their child to college. Id. at 185. But when the provisions adopted were
tax credits, which required the student to have enough taxable income and pay
the money upfront, those provisions created a barrier to those who did not have
the ability to save the money, even if they held jobs where they earned enough
taxable income. Id. at 186.
243. Repetti, supra note 233, at 1497-98.
244. Repetti, supra note 235, at 825-26 ("The share of our country's net
worth held by the top one percent of wealthiest households declined from more
than 44.2% in 1929 to 20.5% in 1979." (citing EDWARD N. WOLFF, Top HEAVY:
A STUDY OF INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA 62 tbl. A-I
(1995))).
245. !d. at 856-57.
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For example, an important 1994 study conducted by David
Joulfaian that examined the tax returns for persons who died in
1982 found that "[t]he combination of charitable bequests, estate
expenses, and taxes accounted on average for ... 41 percent of the
net worth of decedents with gross estate[s] over $10 million.,,246
Yet, soon thereafter, the tax provisions in TRA 1997 undermined
that effort by increasing the applicable exclusion amount. Moreo-
ver, under EGTRRA, the applicable exclusion amount was in-
creased further and the tax rates were reduced.247
While they may not agree on what causes such wealth con-
centration, the experts in the field consistently agree on the effect
of wealth concentration. The reports indicate that wealth concen-
tration is not only harmful to the economy, but may also be harm-
ful for political environments.248 When the majority of wealth is
held by a numerical few, the political system and political climate
may be compromised.r'" The concern is based on the theory that
the wealthy may use their power and influence to support political
candidates who will provide the wealthy with direct access to sup-
port their agendas.i'" While some studies are mixed on whether
elected officials are influenced on issues of high visibility, research
supports the notion that elected officials have been influenced on
less visible issues.251
246. Repetti, supra note 233, at 1499 (citing David Joulfaian, The Distri-
bution and Division of Bequests: Evidence from the Collation Study, 6 (OTA
Paper 71, 1994), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-
analysis/Documents/ota71.pdf).
247. See Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 3-8.
248. Repetti, supra note 235, at 840--49.
249. !d. at 843--49.
250. Fleischer, supra note 120, at 278 & n.71 (citing Repetti, supra note
235, at 843--49).
251. Repetti, supra note 235, at 846 ('The studies have been mixed in
finding a direct relationship between contributions and how senators or members
of the House actually vote in highly visible roll calls on the floor. However, the
studies are much more consistent in finding evidence that the contributions do
playa significant role in influencing the activities of legislators outside the lime-
light of roll call votes on the floor. There is some evidence that contributions
influence roll call votes on issues that do not attract significant publicity. For
example, contributions appear to have influenced votes on trucking legislation
about which there was little publicity. Similarly, contributions seem to have
influenced votes on the Bank Underwriting Bill, which received less publicity
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According to Professor Fleischer, the influence held by the
wealthy is not exercised just by making contributions.252 In reality,
the wealthy, propertied citizens are generally either the community
leaders who have a lot of political capital, or they may even be
political leaders. 253 By using their influence and leverage-and
sometimes even their votes-the wealthy have the ability to sway
the political system in a way that will not be available to the aver-
age citizen. Such results clearly run afoul of the democratic prin-
ciples upon which this nation was founded.
Moreover, Professor Fleischer makes a valid point that
when these wealthy individuals are business leaders in the com-
munity, they may have the ear of political leaders as a result of
their ability to both bring and keep jobs in the area. 254 This type of
access and influence may be benign in some cases, but the poten-
tial for corruption is too much of a risk to ignore and could ulti-
mately cause the public to lose confidence in the political leader-
ship if the corruption were exposed?55 Again, to have this kind of
political persuasion and power passed on from generation to gen-
eration is unfair and inconsistent with democratic principles.f"
Professor Fleischer is also concerned with the efforts of
charitable organizations to lobby for certain political positions.257
In this respect, a charitable organization may be used as a pawn by
the decedent's family to pursue political agendas in a purportedly
than other bills affecting the financial sector. There also have been studies of
state proceedings that found direct evidence that campaign contributions influ-
ence the voting records of state legislators." (footnotes omitted)).
252. Fleischer, supra note 120, at 278-79 (noting that wealth concentra-
tion enables individuals "to influence the political process, both directly and
indirectly").
253. Id. at 279.
254. Id. at 280-81.
255. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate The-
ory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REv. 784, 805 (1985) ("[T]o the extent that we
regard being governed by democratic processes as a good, we are harmed each
time policy choices are made outside those processes.").
256. See Fleischer, supra note 120, at 278-281. If it could somehow be
shown that corrupt political pressures cancel each other out or that for some
other reason policy outcomes resulting from corrupt pressures are the same as
they would be without those pressures, the corruption still would impair the
benefits that citizens obtain from participation in politics.
257. /d. at 288-90.
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neutral way. In addition, Professor Fleischer notes that political
power can be used by these organizations to influence the behavior
of political leaders.r" For instance, a charity could threaten to
leave the community and relocate because of the way a political
leader might vote; when politicians' votes are influenced by such
threats, democratic governance is directly compromised. In this
way, charities can be used in order to gain political favors in a
manner that is almost impossible to prove or regulate.
In general, wealth concentration has a negative impact on
society as whole. With such a vast disparity of wealth, there may
be no single sustainable measure to combat its concentration. The
estate tax, over time, has not been a formidable weapon primarily
because of legislation designed to make the estate tax ineffective.
Even with current proposals to make the estate tax a stronger reve-
nue source, there should be other measures implemented to assist
in the battle against wealth concentration. The following proposals
discuss other measures that may be used in concert with the estate
tax to effectively and efficiently curtail wealth concentration.
C. Proposals to Diminish Wealth Concentration
Over time, abolition of wealth concentration has clearly not
been achieved. In fact, a look at the wealth concentration literature
over the years demonstrates that wealth has become even more
concentrated. In the 1990s, approximately 20% of the nation's
wealth was held by the top 1% of the wealthy.259 Even now, the
majority of the nation's wealth is held by the elite minority with
the top 1% owning almost half of the country's wealth.26o
The studies conducted on philanthropy support this posi-
tion. Individuals and families in the top 5% income bracket repre-
sent 45% of all charitable contributions made in 2000.261 Looking
a little deeper into the numbers, more than 60% of the contribu-
tions were made by the taxpayers in the top 20% income brack-
et.262 The data supports the position that a majority of the wealth
258. /d. at 290.
259. Frederick, supra note 10, at 209.
260. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
261. THE ESTATE TAX AND CHARITABLE GIVING,Supra note 129, at 2.
262. Jd.
2012 Change We Can't Believe In . . . or Afford 551
is held by a minority group and that tax policy may impact the
ability of the government to raise revenue through the estate tax.
In 1988, almost 68,000 estate tax returns were filed, and
although the number ofretums filed decreased in 1989, the number
of estate returns filed steadily increased until 2001.263 By 2001,
the number of estate tax returns filed had increased to almost
124,000?64 By 2004, the number of returns filed had decreased to
almost 87,000, and by 2008, they had further decreased to almost
47,000.265 The significant tax policy change that reversed the trend
was EGTRRA. Beginning in 2002, the effects of EGTRRA were
realized as the applicable exclusion amount increased from $1 mil-
lion to $1.5 million, later increasing to $2 million by 2006.266 As
the exemptions increased, the wealth pool became more concen-
trated, and the taxes generated decreased.
In order to level the playing field and bring some sem-
blance of balance to the political and economical inequities, a
number of multi-level approaches should be implemented to com-
bat wealth concentration. One proposal suggested for dealing with
wealth concentration is to limit inheritance rights.267 For instance,
Professor Ascher argues that inheritance should only be tolerated
when necessary, positing narrow circumstances under which ex-
ceptions should be made.268 In addition, he argues greatly in favor
of leveling out the playing field in order to make opportunities
263. See Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 6-8 tbl. 6.4. In 1989, the number of
returns filed had decreased to 52,000. Id. In 1991, the number of returns filed
had increased to almost 61,000 but still remained below the number filed in
1988. Id. By 1993, the number of estate returns filed had increased to 70,000.
Id. Over the next few years, the number of estate returns continued to increase.
See id. In 1982 almost $8 billion was generated by the estate tax. Id. at 6-6 tbl.
6.2; see also AM. ASS'N OF FUND-RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING USA: 1983
ANNUAL REPORT 7 (Fred Schnaue ed., 1983) (reporting charitable bequest giv-
ing in 1982 was $5.45 billion and individual charitable contributions were re-
ported at almost $49 billion).
264. Joulfaian, supra note 35, at 6-8 tbl. 6.4.
265. !d.
266. Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, § 501(a), 115 Stat. 38, 69 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of26 U.S.c.).
267. Ascher, supra note 60, at 88-91.
268. Id. at 73.
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more equalized.269 In this respect, his position is closely aligned
with the views of Thomas Jefferson, who remarked, "[T]he earth
belongs in usufruct to the living; the dead have neither powers nor
rights over it. The portion occupied by any individual ceases to be
his when he himself ceases to be, and reverts to society....,,270
While Congress could pass legislation that would tax 100%
of property at death, leaving nothing for a taxpayer to pass to his
family, most would agree that such an approach is too harsh. In
fact, it would only trade one problem for another, as the govern-
ment would then have to assume responsibility for the family that
may be impoverished as a result of such a tax, particularly if the
breadwinner was the decedent. Nonetheless, efforts to remove
wealth concentration are not wholly unwise. When Congress ini-
tially enacted the estate tax, albeit as a temporary revenue source,
it took a more balanced approach by taxing only that portion of the
wealthier estates necessary to generate enough revenue to deal
with the government's revenue shortfall. This approach permitted
the decedent to leave a portion of his wealth to care for his family
or sustain his legacy if he so desired. As the government later rec-
ognized that the need to deal with wealth concentration accompa-
nied the need to develop social programs for the poor, these com-
bined purposes lead to the implementation of the estate tax and the
charitable contributionlbequest deduction.
Creating harmony between these multiple goals is lost
when the solution is a total forfeiture. Under Professor Ascher's
position, inheritance is only permitted where public policy justifies
it.271 While such an approach is undoubtedly not widely embraced,
Ascher notes that no natural right to inheritance exists. 272 In addi-
tion, he notes that the need to deal with the federal deficit justifies
an interference with traditional conceptions of inheritance. 273 Ab-
sent six public policy exceptions that would justify permitting in-
269. Id. at 88-91.
270. Id. at 80 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison,
(Sept. 6, 1789)).
271. Id. at 122.
272. Id. at 121.
273. Id.
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heritance,274 the decedent's property should be sold, with the pro-
ceeds payable to the government.275
Professor Ascher's policy exceptions include the following:
martial exemption, exemption for dependent lineal descendants,
exemption for disabled lineal descendants, and exemption for line-
al ascendants when support is needed. 276 With the aforementioned
four exemptions, Professor Ascher posits that providing for imme-
diate family members who need support is clearly a public policy
justification that is easy to support. 277
He proposes limitations even where immediate family
members are beneficiaries, thereby focusing on the limitations that
would curtail wealth passed down through the generations and re-
duce wealth concentration.V" For instance, Professor Ascher has
proposed a sliding scale of marital exemption in certain cases, not
the full unlimited inter-spousal transfers under the current sys-
tem.279 Under his system, at certain intervals, the surviving spouse
would gain the right to receive more of the decedent's estate, with
the right to inherit the full estate after twenty years of marriage. 280
While this exemption seems entitlement-based, it is in
some sense also support-based on account of time in marriage be-
ing used as the basis for a sliding scale to determine the marital
share. By basing the marital rights on time invested in the mar-
riage, his proposal seeks to give proper respect to the contributions
of the surviving spouse to the acquisition of property to the mar-
. h h ibuti 281nage, even w en t e contn ution was non-monetary.
The other family exemptions are clearly support-based, un-
like the marital exemption. Professor Ascher suggests that if the
274. Id at 122.
275. Id
276. Id
277. See id. (describing these four exceptions as resting "on relatively
indisputable grounds").
278. Id at 127.
279. Id at 124-26.
280. Id After one year of marriage, the surviving spouse would be enti-
tled to 24% ofthe estate. Id at 126. After seven years of marriage, the surviv-
ing spouse would be entitled to 48% of the estate. Id At the fourteen-year
mark, the surviving spouse would be entitled to 76%, and after twenty years of
marriage, the surviving spouse would be entitled to the full estate. Id
281. 1d.
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children are healthy adults, then passing wealth to those children is
essentially passing an unearned financial advantage to the next
generation.282 He instead suggests a sliding scale based on the age
of the child and expectations of the parent to the child, with a cut
off age of twenty-five for any adult, healthy non-dependent
child.283 This proposition is based on the premise that once a child
has been provided an opportunity to achieve a higher education,
that child should be in a position to pursue a career and support
himself or herself financially.Y"
Aside from the administrative costs, it is difficult to deter-
mine where to draw the inheritance line where gray areas exist.
Under Professor Ascher's plan, courts would be in the business of
managing and monitoring relationships. There should be limita-
tions, but not to the point of micro-managing marital relationships.
Fortunately, this Article's proposal does not encompass these ad-
ministrative burdens. By setting the estate tax applicable exclusion
amount at $2 million per taxpayer, without analyzing the family
and marital situations, the government receives revenue from taxa-
tion when the decedent's property exceeds this amount. In addi-
tion, whether a person is married or unmarried, has children-adult
or not--or has no children, he would be well within his rights to
pass his property to the person or entity of his choosing as it stands
under our current system.
Professor Fleischer has also examined the notion of using
the estate tax to minimize wealth concentration. 285 Specifically,
she has placed the focus on the charitable bequest deduction, pro-
posing that charitable bequests should only be deductible if the
deduction would minimize the wealth concentration.F" For exam-
ple, a charitable bequest would be deductible if the bequest would
remove assets from the family's contro1.287 If the recipient chari-
table organization has no personal connection to the donor, then
282. Jd. at 127.
283. Jd. at 128.
284. Jd. at 127.
285. Fleischer, supra note 120.
286. ld. at 283.
287. ld. at 284. For example, if the bequest were made to the Humane
Society, a college, or other public charity and control of such organization was
by someone other than a family member, then the contribution to that organiza-
tion would be fully deductible. Id.
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neither the donor nor a family member would still be in control of
the assets.288 If those assets are outside the control of the donor
and his or her family members, then the donor would not be able to
use those assets to maintain economic and political power.289 If,
on the other hand, the contribution is made to a public or private
charitable organization that is controlled by the family, the contri-
bution would not be deductible.f'" Since the donor would still
have influence over who to benefit and how they would be benefit-
ted, that amounts to having an undesirable control over the fates of
others.291
This Article agrees that a donor's continued control in the
charitable organization should bring some limitation on the donor's
ability to receive a charitable deduction for having made such a
contribution. More pointedly, this Article also agrees that the do-
nor's family would ultimately be the beneficiaries of the trans-
ferred political and economical power. Nevertheless, this Article
disagrees with Professor Fleischer's method to combat this re-
tained control.
After all, the truth is that any organization that provides
services to others-particularly those with limited resources-will
be influenced. No matter who is making the decisions, there will
always be some level of influence and coercion at play. Therefore,
detailed attempts to regulate behavior would bring about disputes
that would likely have to be determined on a case-by-case basis,
requiring the kinds of government resources and manpower that
may not necessarily bring about a wealth reduction.
Under Professor Fleischer's proposal, deductibility of a
contribution is based on the control of the donor, or really the do-
nor's family, over the recipient charitable organization. In situa-
tions where private foundations demonstrated a lack of control by
the donor's family, these foundations would receive the same tax
treatment as the public charities. In my opinion, this is not a better
result given that most private foundations serve a specialized seg-
ment of the population.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. [d.
291. Id.
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Although this Article agrees with the fact that it is harmful
to society to have such generational political power passed through
generations, my conflict with Professor Fleischer's proposal is that
it vests the government with undesirable control over human be-
havior. While this Article is not challenging the merits of the pro-
posal to fund certain charities, there is a more efficient way to
bring about a similar result.
Rather than deciding which organizations are worthy of a
full deduction and which organizations are not, the better approach
is to treat all similarly-situated organizations in a similar manner.
Consistent with prior arguments, a proven method has already been
established in the income tax system. Modeling the income tax
provisions, the charitable bequest deduction should be limited to
50% of the estate tax base for public charities that qualify under
sections 501(c)(3) and 170(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Moreover, when making charitable bequests to private founda-
tions, the deduction would be limited to 20% of the estate tax base.
By using this method, revenue may be generated while re-
taining the incentive to encourage charitable giving. While limit-
ing the amount that is deductible might not necessarily limit a do-
nor's power and influence over the organization, it would limit
some of the family's resources because a portion of the estate that
would have gone to the foundation would now be diverted as taxes.
Therefore, coupled with the recommendation to reduce the appli-
cable exclusion amount to $2 million and set the top marginal rate
at 55%, the estate tax could lead to a revenue raising change we
have not seen since the early history of its implementation.
Because of these reasons, the case for setting limits to the
charitable bequest deduction is strong. In years past, the estate tax
has not been a big revenue raiser, and it certainly has not been ef-
fective in curtailing wealth concentration. By implementing my
proposals, however, the government could generate the kind of
additional revenue that is needed to address the U.S. economic
situation. Rather than placing the burden on the backs of the non-
wealthy, this Article's proposals soundly place the burden on the
citizens who have the ability to pay. Moreover, by limiting the
charitable bequest deduction to 50% of the gross estate to public
charities and 20% of the gross estate to private foundations, this
Article's proposals could bring about a good source of revenue for
the government and more resources to the general population.
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Our government should not sacrifice revenue in favor of
benefitting the economic elite. Yet, while we want our govern-
ment to raise revenue to sustain our economy, we also want to bal-
ance that goal with that of individuals to transfer a generous estate
to the natural objects of their bounty. There is a balance, and it is
up to our government to implement what is appropriate.
Although many purposes were reflected in the decision to
make the estate tax permanent, the current focus of the tax, as with
most other taxes, should be on its revenue potential. While the
progressives' pursuit against wealth concentration may have lost
support over the years, that is no reason to stop seeking needed tax
policy reforms. Most opponents of the estate tax do not currently
have a taxable estate, and despite the belief that they one day will,
such a notion does not justify proposals to repeal the tax. Never-
theless, while the estate tax has the potential to serve valuable ob-
jectives, it is of little utility in the absence of thoughtful and pro-
gressive tax policies.
VI. CONCLUSION
During the later part of 2008, the United States came face-
to-face with its own economic reckoning. Still, despite all of the
economic turmoil, the government refused to implement revenue
raising measures, even though historically that had been an effec-
tive way to deal with the situation. This Article demonstrates how
to make the estate tax more effective in its revenue potential and
endeavors to show why the changes are crucial to the economic
recovery of the country. Given our high debt, economical slump,
and ongoing military conflicts, the right move for the country is to
use our progressive system of taxation to place the financial bur-
dens on those most financially capable of paying.
By raising the applicable exclusion amount and reducing
the top marginal rate to 35%, the government provided a tax break
to the wealthy at a time when the majority of Americans were suf-
fering economically. Moreover, less revenue was raised at a time
when, historically, the opposite should have occurred. The estate
tax has been a consistent revenue source during times of economic
crisis, and it should be used for that purpose in a way that brings
about a maximum result. By simply increasing the top marginal
rate to 55% and reducing the applicable exclusion amount to $2
million per taxpayer, while contemporaneously reducing the un-
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limited charitable bequest deduction to 50% for contributions to
public charities and 20% for contributions to private foundations,
the government has the potential to generate a substantial amount
of revenue.
History, economists, and the economy all point to the fact
that the estate tax should remain permanent. Moreover, by view-
ing the estate tax as a revenue source, the tax may be used most
effectively. By reducing wealth concentration and bolstering gov-
ernment revenues, the proposals in this Article may serve to bring
harmony between our tax system and social public policy. Such is
the type of change in which we can believe.
